Ethics and Philosophy: An Evaluation of the “Do Not Harm” Principle

In this paper, I briefly characterise and analyse the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle. I argue that while this view is attractive under our normal understanding of harm, it neglects the possibility of subconsciously harming oneself. While one argues that harm to oneself is consensual, this view is ultimately unattractive as it fails to explain how one can consent to subconscious harm.  

The view says that thoughts cannot and do not violate the “do not harm without the person’s consent” principle. Before exploring its advantages and disadvantages, this view will have to spell out a number of crucial details.  

First of all, why should we care about the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle? Before we answer that, we must first make clear of what do we mean by thoughts. For the purpose of this essay, “thought” does not mean any idea generated by thinking in the minds. By thoughts, I mean ideas generated by thinking in our minds that are disconnected from actions. This includes ideas independent of our actions, meaning they are never executed. In this essay, we will refer these ideas as bad thoughts, because executing that those thoughts will cause detriment to another. 

Generally, there are two levels to our thoughts – initial thoughts, and subsequent thoughts. By initial thoughts, I mean thoughts that arise by itself, and thoughts that are not derived from any previous thoughts. Subsequent thoughts, on the other hand, are conscious expansion of bad thoughts, derived by initial thoughts of harm. When one possesses subsequent harmful thoughts, he knows that the initial thought is harmful.   

Consider the case where I am sitting a boring Math lecture and I suddenly think “what if I knock my professor down?” This is an initial thought that comes to my mind without any prior thoughts. Knowing the consequences and sanctions I will get from knocking my professor down, I decide not to act it out. However, I spend my whole lecture visualising myself knocking my professor down. These are subsequent thoughts, as I consciously let these thoughts entertain me, knowing that they are bad thoughts. I know they are bad thoughts, because if acted out, the physical detriment is harmful to my professor.  

For the purpose of this essay, we will only consider subsequent thoughts that are disconnected from actions, because of an important distinction between initial and subsequent thoughts. Initial thoughts are often unconsciously produced, meaning they are not under out conscious moral control. We therefore do not know if they are morally assessible. On the other hand, subsequent thoughts, since they are consciously produced and processed, are morally assessible. Thus, subsequent thoughts that are disconnected from actions are the only kinds of thoughts considered in this essay.  

Now that we know what we mean by thoughts, we can finally ask: why should we care about the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle? In our daily lives, we often encounter bad thoughts. On one hand, it seems that bad thoughts are not morally wrong, because they are not connected to action. When I think about pinching my friend but refrain from doing so, I am not harming anyone in an intuitive sense. On the other hand, some thoughts can be very morally repulsive. When we hear them, we want to condemn whoever possesses these thoughts for merely having these thoughts, even if they are disconnected from our actions. Consider a person who fantasises about raping children but never acts upon these fantasises. We would think that this person should receive legal sanction, or at least rehabilitation just for having these thoughts, because they are so morally outrageous that we simply cannot leave him alone.   

This, hence, makes this essay an interesting investigation, because we can find an answer through a deontologist’s view. The point and purpose of this essay is to figure out how a deontologist would answer whether bad thoughts violate the “do not harm” principle. In deontology, the “do not harm” principle is one of the two moral principles of deontological moral systems. Given that it is a useful philosophical theory on attempting to maximise welfare, it is interesting to explore how bad thoughts interact with the “do not harm” principle in deontology.  

So, what counts as doing harm? Before defining what harm is, we must explain what it does not mean. In the context of this essay, harm is not equivalent to crime, because not all kinds of harm are criminalized. Generally, there is a liberal definition to things that cause harm. This includes events that cause detriment to someone if and only if it makes her worse than she would have otherwise been. This means harm is an imposition that causes undesirable detriment or unwanted suffering to another person. Harm can be understood as the undesirable effect in our minds induced by a series of stimuli, and it is important for the intended receiver of harm to be able to possess these stimuli, in order to observe the harm and undesirable effect in our minds. For example, in order to cause harm, when I pinch my friend, he would have to have detest or oppose to the harm I inflict upon him.  

If harm is an undesirable effect in our minds, then what qualifies as undesirable? If an act is undesired by the person receiving the harm, the person is receiving unwanted actions towards him. This means he does not consent to the harm imposed on him, and it would hence be impermissible to harm. Therefore, the permissibility to harm is indicative by a person’s consent, or lack thereof. This means that the do not harm principle is followed by a specification, that one must do not harm without another’s consent. This also means that it is impossible to harm when there is consent, hence consensual harm doesn’t exist. We will proceed with this essay by referring to such harm as consensual suffering.  

Here are some examples of consensual suffering. For example, in contact sports, such as rugby, a person is voluntarily putting him/herself into the situation where the goal is to successfully tackle the opponent physically. Physical tackling techniques can lead to physical detriments to another person, such as bruising to one’s eye. The injuries and pain a professional rugby player suffers amount to harm. However, these injuries are consensual and are considered permissible in our daily lives. Also consider the case of massage. When I receive a massage, the massager is kneading parts of my body in order to relief the tension of my muscles. The kneading of my body can cause discomfort and even pain, but I am consenting someone to intentionally inflict physical discomfort on me. This would be a permissible type of harm as it is consensual. An example of consensual harm would be firing a rubber band at my high school nemesis in class, knowing that she would not consent to such harm, also knowing that she would receive physical and mental discomfort from my act.  

An advantage of this view is its alignment to our normal understanding of harm. By normal understanding of harm, I do not mean harm in a legal context, which not only includes physical harm, but also specific kinds of harm such as damage to reputation or dignity. By normal understanding of harm, I mean causing another to suffer physically or mentally, where harm is unwanted by the sufferer. This includes but is not limited to the infliction of physical pain or mental detriment like anger. 

As characterised previously, harm is an imposition that causes undesirable detriment to another person who does not want to be harmed. If a person’s bad thoughts are disconnected from actions, there are no external consequences from the person’s bad thoughts. The intended receiver of the harm can only be affected, either if the thought is executed and there are external consequences, or he becomes aware of the thinker’s thoughts, and feels discomforted. Since there are no external consequences because the thinker never does anything, the intended receiver of the harm or victim of the thought can never be aware of the bad thoughts. Therefore, the intended receiver of harm is not affected, as the thought is neither executed nor made aware of.  

This understanding aligns with our intuitive understanding of harm, which proposes that if the thought produces no external consequence, and the intended receiver of harm does not know about the thoughts, he is not affected. When a thought crosses my mind, the status and state of the intended recipient of harm remains unchanged and unaffected. Under our normal and intuitive understanding of harm, this intended recipient is not actually harmed. For example, if I punch my friend in the face, I will be inflicting physical harm as well as causing him to be angry, which is a form of mental harm. However, suppose I only think about punching him in the face. I do not act upon it and I make sure he doesn’t know about my thoughts. Then, I will have nothing more than a bad thought. Assume that he has never been punched by me and does not know about my thought. As long as I do not actually punch my friend, he will not appreciate the risk of me hurting him. There is, hence, nothing for him to experience. This cannot be harm, because I did not actually inflict the physical pain from punching on him.  

This is an advantageous and desirable view, especially in our daily lives, because it seems to get the right results in many cases. If I think of killing someone but never acts upon it, no harm is inflicted upon that person. It is only harmful if I actually stab that person to death, assuming pain and death is intrinsically bad. This would, then, suggest that my stabbing is harmful to him. This converges with our normal understanding of harm. The convergence is desirable because we want a view to align with our common understanding of morality.  

However, the previous view seems off by saying that mere thoughts can do no harm at all. The previous view has only considered harm to others when there is, in fact, harm to oneself. A person can harm himself with bad thoughts, which are undesirable thoughts of inflicting harm to others. In short, indulgence of harmful thoughts can impede our ability to make correct moral judgements and to receive moral truths. This is because if my access to moral facts is hindered, I cannot receive correct and comprehensive moral truths; because I cannot receive good moral truths, I am not able to act according to these truths, which would prevent me from making correct moral judgements. This counts as our own undesirable detriment and hence is considered harm.  

So how do thoughts impede our ability to make correct moral judgements and to receive moral truths? Suppose Tom loves watching violent movies. He very often fantasises killing his kindergarten nemesis with ways he has seen in the movies. He never acts upon his fantasies but he entertains himself with these thoughts by picturing them very graphically. Usually, a normal rational person would be disgusted by the graphic display of stabbing a person to death. However, as Tom thinks about killing his nemesis all the time, his perception of the killing is desensitised. This means if he was given a knife, he would feel less revulsion compared to a normal rational person, and might even be tempted to stab his nemesis, thinking that perhaps this is not as bad as it seems. The previous argument would argue that up until this point, no actual harm is done, since these are merely Tom’s thoughts, and he hasn’t actually killed his kindergarten nemesis. However, this is actually harmful to Tom himself. This is harmful because his perception of morality has been impaired, by being desensitised from his indulgence in killing fantasies. This prevents him from receiving accurate moral information, which is that killing is bad and we should be morally revolted by it. If Tom cannot receive accurate moral information, it is difficult for him to make correct moral choices in the future, because he will base his actions off an inaccurate moral compass.  

Consider our moral intuitions as a kind of perceptive faculty. Much like how our sense experience is a form of faculty of sensibility that perceives the world, our moral intuition is a form of faculty for moral intuition that perceives moral truths. By constantly indulging in bad thoughts, one’s ability to perceive moral truth will be distorted. This will malignantly hinder our moral faculty. Therefore, bad thoughts can still harm, in a way that the thinker, by entertaining himself with these thoughts, can lose touch of the real word, and hence lose the ability to perceive the moral world. This will prevent them from getting accurate moral information. Ultimately, it will be harder for them to do the right thing as their perceptive faculty has been impaired. That, in and of itself, is harmful to the thinker. Harm is previously defined as unwanted detriment to a person. Ruining a perceptive faculty is considered harmful. After all, if taking one’s eyeballs out and ruining his faculty of vision is a form of suffering and harmful, ruining one’s faculty for moral intuition is also considered harmful. 

Thus, the previous argument that thoughts cannot harm is undesirable, because it fails to include all consequences of an act. If doesn’t take into account harm to oneself, which is a highly probable consequence from having bad thoughts. This is unattractive because we want a theory that encapsulates all possible consequences of an act.  

Prima facie, the previous view does make sense in saying that one can cause detriment to self by having thoughts of imposing harm to others. However, does the purported self-harm constitute as actual harm? Perhaps not. In fact, one might suggest that it is impossible to harm oneself, since self-harm is always consensual. It is important to note that one must not equate consent to desire, which is a term indicative of strong approval and preference. While desire can be a precondition to consent, consent does not necessary have to be derived from desire. Suppose I am a wrestler. In a match, I must consent to physical harm inflected by my opponent. However, I do not desire getting punched. I consent to it, because it is inevitable and it helps me win the match, not because I desire the harm.  

When executing an action, the action must first be processed through our minds. Our brain would have to consent to us to harm in order for our bodies to execute the action of inflicting a harmful act. This is a decision one makes consensually. Given our definition of harm, harm has to be unwanted. If a person doesn’t want something, she would not consent to it. Our freedom to consent and choose what we think is best for us according to reason is sufficient to amount to consent. If consensual harm isn’t harm, it is never possible for a person to harm himself.  

Hence, if we make a choice, it implies that the choice is consensual. By deciding to proceed to pinching myself, I have made the choice of consenting myself to pinch. It would be, hence, permissible for me to inflict the discomfort and impossible for me to harm myself, as I have consented to my own actions.  

However, the previous response seems to be flawed, as it overlooks the subtle distinction between consenting to an act and consenting to its effects and consequences, as the two are not, in fact, the same. The previous view says that as long as I have consented to receiving detriments, there is no harm. Usually this is a sound view – I pay to have a new tattoo, knowing that it would hurt or possibly get infected. The view says that no harm is imposed on me because it is I have consented to it. However, this might seem bizarre in other cases. Suppose I will undergo a risky surgery. The previous view says that as long as I have consented the surgery, the surgery itself can never be harmful. Suppose the doctor did not inform me of all he risks of the surgery, and I do not know that the surgery will have the likely effect of me getting an infection. Is there still no harm? Perhaps not.  

Consent can and should only be made if the consenter is fully informed of the possible likely consequences of an act. By possible likely consequences, I do not mean consequences with chances so slim that we do not need to know about. I only mean consequences that are probable enough that I should be aware of. Therefore, in order to consent to the act of thinking bad thoughts, the person must understand that the act of thinking bad thoughts will have the likely effect of corrupting her faculty of perceiving moral truths. Suppose person A entertains herself with bad thoughts all the time. She seems to be consenting and allowing herself to have the bad thoughts. However, she is not consenting to undermining her perceptive faculty, which is a subconscious effect. For person A to consent to an act, person A must have a reasonable understanding of the likely consequences of having bad thoughts.  

Often times, the likely effect of corrupting one’s faculty of perceiving moral truths is unknown and subconscious to the thinker, making it an almost impossible consequence to consent to. Since the effect of the harm usually goes unnoticed, the reason for the corruption of moral intuition is unknown. Person A cannot be aware of her impairment in moral intuition, which is the effect. Therefore, if person A is not aware of the impairment, there is no way of knowing the reason behind the corruption of her moral intuition.  

Technically, it is not impossible to consent to the impairment of moral intuition. Person A can seek help from a psychologist or therapist, who would explain to her the detrimental effects bad thoughts can have. She will, then, be informed of the consequences and can hence consent. However, in paradigmatic situations, we do not go to a therapist, nor do we understand the risks behind having bad thoughts. This is because we are not aware of the detrimental effects we are experiencing from the bad thoughts.  

Thus, given how hard and unusual it is to consent to one’s impairment of moral intuition, person A is not fully informed of possible consequences, and hence cannot fully appreciate the risks from the act of thinking bad thoughts. Therefore, person A does not and cannot consent to the “harm” of corrupting her faculty of perceiving moral truths. Because of this, this “harm” would still count as harm technically, and will then fall under the domain of the deontological principle “do not harm”.  

When a person seems to be consenting to the act of harming, it is very unlikely for her to actually be consenting. This is because she cannot give consent to start with, since the effects are subconscious and unknown to her. The previous response is flawed and undesirable, because it doesn’t give an accurate account to human nature, and overlooks the subtle distinction between consenting to an act and consenting to its effects and consequences. Sometimes we lose grip on our unconscious thoughts, which are impossible to give consent to.