Garrett Hardin’s lifeboat ethics model in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee system
PART 1 Introduction
Given the city’s abundance of resources and longstanding history of immigration, it is hardly a wonder why Hong Kong has been such a perennial magnet for refugees seeking sanctuary. However, beneath the continental, prosperous surface, the metropolis remains to be one of the slowest cities when it comes to processing refugee claims, with the lowest degree of refugee claim acceptance.
Following a Court of Final Appeal ruling in 2013, Hong Kong currently operated under government-led screening mechanism called the Unified Screening Mechanism1 (USM). From claims based on risk of return to persecution to torture claims, allegations of various nature are categorised as non-refoulment claims and assessed collectively under the USM. 2 Since 2004, only less than 0.4 percent of applications has been deemed substantiated, which is far lower than the global average of 30 per cent and European average of 60 per cent. On top of the arguably disproportionate ratio of claims processing to claims acceptance, Hong Kong also prohibits its asylum seekers from working while their claims are being processed. Based on this brief overview of the system, it becomes clear why Hong Kong’s current refugee framework has attracted as much attention from local NGOs and international entities as it has, which will be elaborated later in the body of this essay.
Recently, the Immigration Department has proposed amendments to current regulations which have drawn criticisms from multiples legal bodies. Many proposed items seek to “fast track current procedures”3, by introducing policies such as the early removal of rejected claimants. A few of the most notable critics amongst the legal bodies rejecting these policy amendments are perhaps the Hong Kong Law Society and Hong Kong Bar Association: the former blast the Immigration Department for lack of jurisdiction in sending home claimants that have already lodged legal challenges, and the latter found the proposals to be “seriously compromising [to] the fairness of the decision-making process”4. As a consequence, the aforementioned issues with Hong Kong’s controversial refugee policies not only attracted considerable – and conceivably deserved – public attention, but furthermore raised a multitude of questions, particularly concerning the moral obligations and degree of accountability Hong Kong possesses regarding such a sensitive dilemma that will ultimately affect more than just Hong Kong’s egocentric fears.
In light of current the above debates, this paper seeks to explore the desirability of Hardin’s lifeboat ethics theory in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee framework. It does so first by examining the lifeboat ethics theory, which holds that resourceful nations are not and should not be ethically responsible for providing humanitarian aid to other nations. Subsequently, it questions whether Hong Kong should adopt Hardin’s model, by assessing Hardin’s views on humanitarian aid on three levels: 1) on one’s moral accountability to provide humanitarian aid, 2) on the outcomes of humanitarian aid, and 3) on nations’ ability to provide humanitarian aid.
The first level concerns Hardin’s view that one lacks of moral accountability towards providing humanitarian aid due to the tragedy of the commons. It is an incomplete view, as it only considers refugees as a cause of the tragedy of the commons, and fails to consider them as a product of it. The second level concerns Hardin’s view that providing aid leads to detrimental outcomes at the expense of one’s self-interest. It is a narrowed view on ethical egoism, because it sees the interests of others and that of ours as a necessary trade-off, when in reality and in the context of refugees, some acts of benefitting others can be of our best interest. The third level concerns Hardin’s view that nations are, and will eventually be incapable of providing humanitarian assistance. It is a limited view, because it assumes a fixed output of resources when in fact, humanitarian assistance should be seen as a broad spectrum that encapsulates all types and degree of aid. Further to the analysis of Hardin’s model, the paper also briefly considers an alternative theory, namely Peter Singer’s argument on humanitarian assistance, as a possible way of addressing Hardin’s incomplete arguments.
Therefore, this paper is of the view that Hardin’s lifeboat ethics is only desirable to the extent, where it portrays humanitarian assistance in a rather narrowed and incomplete ethical egoistic manner, which does not truly reflect the versatility and possibilities of humanitarian aid.
PART 2 Garett Hardin’s Lifeboat Model
Hardin’s model of lifeboat ethics revolves around a thought experiment that seeks to encapsulate the dynamic between nations. Specifically, this refers to nations that are able to provide assistance of any nature and nations that can benefit from such assistance. For the purpose of this essay, nations that are able to assist – namely nations that can provide assistance to refugees – will be referred to as assistants from hereon; nations that benefit from the assistance, which are the refugees, will be referred to as beneficiaries.
Hardin’s metaphor describes a lifeboat possessing 50 occupied seats, with room for only 10 more people. 100 swimmers are “swimming in the water outside, begging for admission”5 to the lifeboat. Figuratively, each assistant represents a lifeboat, whereas the swimmers are refugees who come from “the poor of the world”6, without their own lifeboats and desperate for help. Assuming that the needs and values of all swimmers are the same, this begs the question: what should the lifeboat passengers do? Hardin suggests three possible options:
Live by the “Christian ideal of being our brother’s keeper”7 and take all 100 swimmers into the lifeboat, since the needs of all swimmers are the same.
Given the excess capacity of 10 more passengers, admit only 10 more swimmers.
Admit no more to the lifeboat.
Hardin first argues that option 1 is the least desirable, as it means a total of 150 people are somehow meant to survive in a lifeboat designed for 60. This is obviously not possible, and as such, the lifeboat sinks and everyone drowns, resulting in “complete justice, complete catastrophe”8. He proceeds to argue that option 2 is not optimal either; firstly, there is no fair mechanism for anyone to select which 10 swimmers can be admitted, considering the needs and values of all swimmers are identical. Furthermore, to extend upon the reasoning for option 1’s impracticality, filling the lifeboat completely would mean losing the “safety factor”9, which refers to the engineering principle of ensuring a system's structural capacity is viable beyond its expected or actual loads – for example, nations leaving room for excess capacity in order to combat unexpected natural disasters. In light of the undesirability of options 1 and 2, Hardin eventually suggests option 3 as the lesser evil and thus the solution, claiming that “our survival is then possible although we shall have to be constantly on guard against boarding parties”10. In other words, if we were to follow Hardin’s philosophy, no nation should assist others, nor are they or should they be obliged to.
PART 3 Argument: Moral accountability
3.1. Summary
The blanket statement that is Hardin’s argument for the tragedy of the commons is undesirable as presupposes the demoralization of charity and fails to consider the tragedy of the commons on a macro-level. This part examines the preceding criticism, posits that a moral obligation to assist refugees does in fact exist, and questions the extent to which resourceful nations should possess a moral obligation in regards to refugees.
3.2. Hardin’s Argument: The tragedy of the commons
Hardin asserts that countries should not provide direct financial assistance to countries in need due to the tragedy of the commons, which will lead to a deterioration of resources as a whole.
Before assessing how the tragedy of the commons supports the act of not providing assistance – and subsequently, Hardin’s argument – it is important to first examine the concept of the tragedy of the commons. In short, the theory refers to the exploitation and “misappropriation of common property resources”11. Hardin illustrates this theory with the example of a shepherd: in a pasture with privatised lands owned by individual shepherds, it is both natural and rational for shepherds to increase their herds and maximize profit, as their sense of responsibility – which stems from ownership of the farm – would prompt them to make the most economically sensible choice. However, suppose the pasture becomes “a commons open to all”12 – since the commons is now a natural resource owned by no one, each person’s right to use the land may not be “achieved by a corresponding responsibility to protect it”13. In other words, this means a person can use the entirety of the land without any contribution, which would inevitably destroy one’s incentives to produce and to wisely consume, thereupon accelerating the exhaustion of resources.
On a macro-level, Hardin argues that humanitarian efforts such as the World Food Bank and Food for Peace program14 are real-life depictions of the tragedy of the commons. Specifically, he posits that the Food for Peace program is nothing but a humanitarian gesture at the expense of taxpayers, and that the World Food Bank will lead to careless depletion of resources until “the world’s food source [is] ruined for everyone”15. He contends that the generosity in liberal immigration policies and humanitarian aids will have a “demoralizing effect on the receiver”16, and that said effect would lead to the destruction of the environment and the world’s ruin for future generations. Considering his description of a “crowded world [consisting] of less than perfect human beings”17, Hardin seems to be suggesting that a nation whose natural resources are open to the larger public will eventually become “a potential target for ruthless overexploitation”18, hence the metaphor of the sinking lifeboat and drowning passengers. These resourceful nations, Hardin rather questionably maintains, “must act as trustees of a civilization that is threatened by… a ruinous breeding race”19.
3.3. Criticism
Hardin postulates that charity often has a “demoralizing effect”20 and claims that receivers of aid will exploit common resources; while this proposed possibility regarding the effects of humanitarian aid is certainly logical and entirely plausible, it does, however, present a rather generalised observation that can lead to extreme consequences.
In reality, there are more than plenty of instances where common pooling of resources can be effectivity mobilized. The studies of Emery Roe and those of Nobel prize-winner Elinor Ostrom successfully demonstrate “fresh ways of thinking about the protection of common property resources”21 through unstated contracts and social rules, to name a few. Hardin’s pessimism towards the possibility of constructive utilization of humanitarian aid therefore presents a technical fallacy in his argument by over-generalizing reality.
Beyond Hardin’s technical fallacy, there lies a much substantive issue in Hardin’s position. Hardin generalizes humanitarian aid, and prompts nations to not provide any assistance because he finds demoralization to be the general case. Namely, he finds humanitarian aid demoralizing because it encourages individuals to act irresponsibly. This claim disregards the possibility of using humanitarian aid as a stepping-stone in a constructive manner, in order to promote self-sufficiency in less resourceful nations. This implies that all aid worsens problems (including medicine, technology, etc). However, this notion that humanitarian aid worsens problems encourages a “live and let die”22 mentality.
As mentioned previously, this generalised view can, however, lead to extreme, morally undesirable consequences. Consider this: if food aid such as the World Food Bank only worsens problems, then it can be logically inferred that medical aid should be avoided too, for nations where nourishment is uncertain. It would then follow that other forms of assistance – such as long-term medical expertise and equipment that can improve health services – should likewise be avoided. Therefore, one like Næss would suggest that, according to this “live and let die”23 logic, the most effective solution would perhaps be “a gentle putting to death by means of biochemical mass destruction weapons”24. which justifies the killing for the survival of another. Even if that is true and it is morally justifiable to kill under lifeboat ethics, this view is still undesirable because in its most egregious interpretation, Hardin fails to justify the act of specifically targeting swimmers and choosing to kill them over passengers. The immediate argument that passengers deserve their seats would not stand, since Hardin’s arguments are built on the assumption that “immigrants and native-born citizens are of exactly equal quality”25.
Therefore, in the context of refugees, Hardin’s notion that humanitarian aid encourages exploitation, and should therefore be stopped can lead to extreme and undesirable results that have yet to be morally justified.
3.4. Response to criticism
In response to the previous criticism which posits that failing to assist nations would lead to morally undesirable consequences, Hardin would likely justify such treatment by saying those unfortunate nations should be held accountable for their own actions. This probability is elucidated through his accusations of those nations for being incapable of understanding the significance of budgeting resources because he believes they lack “either the wisdom or the competence, or both”26.
Accordingly, one may argue that the section 3.3. fails to distinguish between the acts of actively causing harm and simply refusing to be a Good Samaritan. While it is true that some nations are in need of help, this view contends that “each country is solely responsible for its own well-being”27, and therefore resourceful nations should not be held morally accountable or responsible for another nation’s lack of resources. The mere fact that some nations are more resourceful does not necessitate liability or any obligation to provide humanitarian support. Hardin goes one step further to argue that refusing to assist is not harmful, but actually helpful to nations in need; he does so by arguing that nations should “not feed those who suffer from starvation”28. He reasons that, under the theory of lifeboat ethics, if assistants continue to provide humanitarian support, malignant operational consequences will arise as beneficiary countries become increasingly reliant upon their support. In continuing the provision of humanitarian aid, beneficiaries will fail to “learn to mend their ways and will suffer progressively greater emergencies as their populations grow”29, so the act of cutting off humanitarian support should theoretically help beneficiary nations “learn from experience”30 for long-term growth. In less savory, shorter terms, Hardin believes that the act of withholding provision of any humanitarian aid is a means to facilitating the development of the beneficiary nation’s competence. The beneficiaries’ predicaments cannot be blamed on anyone besides themselves and their own incompetence, and as a result, they should be the only ones responsible for rectifying the state of their respective nations – the non-assistance approach is, according to Hardin, by all means a blessing in disguise for the beneficiaries.
3.5. Criticism to 3.4’s response
Aside from the ludicrous nature of Hardin’s case, even if we do follow his previous line of reasoning and base moral responsibility on accountability, one can still argue that refugees are a product of the tragedy of the commons on a global scale, which effectively incriminates all nations and subsequently makes them all accountable and responsible for providing humanitarian aid. In today’s environmental landscape, “climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements”31, a collective product of all nations; these events of nature’s degradation have further “limited our natural resources, such as drinking water”32, and have produced a group of climate refugees forced to leave their homeland. As powerful countries continue to sustain their power by industrialisation, nations who are less competitive are left with limited access to common resources, such as clean air, fresh water, and more. As highlighted by Paavole, this circumstance is exemplified through common access to atmospheric sinks, which are natural reservoirs for the storage of greenhouse gases such as forests. Paavole calls this the ultimate tragedy of the commons, as these reservoirs can be accessed by any user “before other users make them unavailable”33, and as the tragedy of the commons predicted, the “weak restraint to conserve”34 the sinks have ultimately caused nations to exhaust them. Ergo, nations who fail to reach for these atmospheric sinks before others will therefore produce victims of climate change. In light of Paavole’s arguments, it can be seen why instead of being the cause, refugees should be seen as the product of the tragedy of the commons instead. And as mentioned, if Hardin’s logic were presupposed to be true, then resourceful nations should still be held responsible and offer humanitarian assistance as they are still nevertheless accountable for the refugee problem.
Extending this thread of thinking to the context of refugees in Hong Kong, it can therefore be concluded that even with all things considered, Hong Kong still has a moral obligation to refugees all the same. The question now, then, is to what degree Hong Kong possesses this moral obligation, and to what extent they should extend their aid.
PART 4 Argument: Ethical Egoism
4.1. Summary Hardin’s claims on ethical egoism are undesirable, because they posit the limited view that self-interested individuals the only way to benefit oneself at another’s expense, when in fact, the act of offering humanitarian aid can be an act to benefit oneself. In reality, this will be true to the extent where a nation chooses to benefit itself through maximally risk aversion by guaranteeing the basic, fundamental rights of all.
4.2. Hardin’s Argument: Overpopulation and scarcity
Hardin posits that as his lifeboat model reaches its eventual and final state, if one is confronted with the option of giving up his seat for the swimmer or not give up his seat at all, no one would sacrifice their seat for any the swimmers.
As previously discussed, Hardin first posits our survival is made possible by being “constantly on guard against boarding parties”35. This means the “only means of [the passengers’] survival”36 is to have all passengers agree to not board any swimmer. This is an ethically egoistic view because it maintains that “everyone ought to look after his own interests and to disregard those of other people except in so far as their interests contribute towards his own”37.
Nonetheless, he recognizes that initially some passengers may feel guilty because they think they are only on the lifeboat by being lucky. This “guilt-ridden conscience”38 will thus make the same passengers feel compelled to assist the swimmers. However, Hardin subsequently posits that in those cases, those who are guilt-ridden should simply “get out and yield [their] place to others”39. Similarly, in the case where a swimmer feels guilty for climbing up the boat and taking a passenger’s spot, the swimmer should not climb up the lifeboat at all.
According to Hardin, this “net result of conscience-stricken people”40 who give up their seat indicates the elimination of “guilt-ridden conscience”41 from the lifeboat. As a result, those who are left on the lifeboat are people who “will not himself feel guilty about his good luck”42; these people are concerned and driven by what benefits themselves, and will not further assist any new incoming swimmer so long as 50 out of 60 seats are filled . This is because those with a guilt-ridden conscience have already been eliminated, either by jumping off the lifeboat or being unwilling to climb up the lifeboat.
One implication we can draw from Hardin’s claim, therefore, is that the only way an individual with a guilt-ridden conscience can relief himself of his guilt, is to trade himself for the swimmer, because the interest of the swimmer fails to “contribute towards his own”43. Under this ethical egoistic model, one must choose his interests over another where their interests are in conflict. Therefore, because there are limited seats and resources, passengers will have to forego his interests, namely his seat and his life, to effectively assist the swimmers. This implies an antagonistic nature between the interests of the assistant and beneficiary.
Further, Hardin explains his theory by applying this model to the real world, by claiming that one man’s gain is one man’s loss, vice versa. He argues that overpopulation and scarcity are to blame for the trade-off between interests of the assistant and that of the beneficiary. Namely, resources are limited, and individuals must compete over these resources. Overpopulation therefore worsens this problem, by introducing more individuals to compete for the same amount of resources. By satisfying a growing population’s need, one is forgoing another’s desire. In such a society, where resources are scarce and limited, one must give up their resources to benefit the other. This echoes the previous paragraph, which reinforces the antagonistic nature between the interests of the assistant and beneficiary. According to Hardin, immigration therefore “speeds up the destruction of rich countries”44 who hold much of that limited resources, because it “moves [refugees] to the food”45, at the expense of rich nations. Therefore, Hardin argues that self-interest-based nations should not offers their resources to refugees. Supporters of this view would contend that in the content of Hong Kong, this non-assistance approach is not without merits. As “one of the most densely populated places in the world”46, land shortage has been plaguing Hong Kong especially in recent years. Specifically, living conditions are characterised by “soaring property prices and rents”47 as well as “overcrowded living space and inadequate community facilities”48. Accepting refugees will therefore increase competition for the already-limited land resources. Therefore, according to Hardin’s theory, the only way for Hong Kong to maintain its resources is to act according to what benefits the city, and stay on the lifeboat.
4.3. Criticism
Based on what he believes to be a necessary trade-off between the interest of the assistant to the beneficiary, Hardin argues that “guarding against boarding parties… offers the only means of our survival”49. To him, any lifeboat passenger who is not stricken by guilt, and is concerned with their own interest will not sacrifice their seat for the swimmers, and in doing so, compromise the swimmers’ interests for their own. However, this is not necessarily true for two reasons.
First, Hardin’s notion is false for the simple fact that often people martyr themselves for others. Self-less acts do in fact happen. Specifically, when one seeks the “heroic, unrewarded sacrifices of martyrs”50, people do in fact fail to conform to the ethic egoistic pursuit to “look after [themselves] and no one else”51. It is important to also note that this desire for selfless sacrifice does not equate to Hardin’s example of the “guilt-ridden conscience”52, as the latter may be motivated by self-interest. This brings us to the second reason.
Second, even under the realm ethical egoism, Hardin’s view is limited as it only considers possibilities where the interests of the parties are antagonistic. In fact, it is possible to benefit oneself without compromising the interests of others, and this would still be morally justifiable under universal egoism. Consider the Hardin’s model of the guilt-ridden passenger, who has jumped off the boat out of guilt. From the view of a bystander, the passenger fails to consider his best interest, for he is now dead. However, the dead guilt-ridden passenger’s act of jumping of the lifeboat may have been one motivated by his own interest, namely by liberating himself from guilt and therefore benefitting his own character through the act of self-sacrifice. In this case, the dead passenger is able to consider his self-interests while not compromising the swimmer’s interests; if any, he furthered the swimmer’s interests by allowing an extra swimmer to climb up the lifeboat and take his seat.
Further to the example above, there is also another way of maintaining one’s self-interest while departing from Hardin’s argument, namely the act of securing one’s certainty of survival through maximal risk aversion, since the act of minimising risks benefits oneself. By guaranteeing everyone deserves a minimum and fundamental level of protection, nations are able to benefit themselves by accepting a higher certainty of survival and a lower risk of harm. Specifically, Rawl’s the veil of ignorance effectively demonstrates the idea of maximal risk aversion.
Under the veil of ignorance, our individual attributes are excluded, therefore our result will be focused on what is just and right. Someone whose identity is excluded under the veil of ignorance, would know that their response can directly affect whatever result they choose, and will adopt a maximin strategy53. In fear of ending up as one of the refugees, the person would be inclined to choose what benefits both the assistant and beneficiary, as it will maximise the chance of the person’s own interests regardless of their position. Therefore, rational and self-interested individuals would be incentivised to find a common denominator by imposing an institution to protect the fundamental rights of the refugees, for example, in the case of political refugees, one that ensures their freedom of expression. This suggests that there are, in fact, ways to offer assistance to refugees without drowning a passenger, or exhausting a nation’s resources. This therefore refutes Hardin’s position that “guarding against boarding parties… offers the only means of our survival”54.
This notion does not conflict with universal ethical egoism, because it does not involve a trade-off between the interests of different persons; in fact, it is a win-win situation which, in reality, safeguards the fundamental rights of all. Surely, this is not to say that all nations should provide the same kind of minimal humanitarian assistance, or that this should be the only reason why countries should provide humanitarian assistance; rather, it serves to address Hardin’s failure to consider the possibilities, such as the possibility where one’s interest is not secured at another’s expense.
4.4. Response to criticism
In response to the above criticism, one may argue that Rawls’ veil of ignorance is not always mutually beneficial because one will not indefinitely risk averse.
Rawls' veil of ignorance presupposes that everyone will be incentivised to act rationally and according to the maximin strategy. Under this strategy, the higher the stakes, the more likely an individual will try to maximise the minimum outcome. In risk aversion, one would opt for lower returns and higher certainty, over higher returns with lower certainty. Rawls seems to suggest that no matter what the stakes are, rational individuals always choose to maximally risk averse. However, Rawls' assumption does not always prevail, and an indeterminate degree of risk aversion does not exist. Surely, rational individuals may choose to maximally risk averse, under what Hardin considers the reproductive difference between the [assistant] nations and [beneficiary] nations, which refers to the comparatively rapid rate of reproduction in refugee nations. Namely, if the rational person behind the veil is informed that there is double the refugees as there is non-refugees, the rational person will allow foreign assistance and choose to implement fundamental rights protection. However, Nobel prize-winner John Harsanyi would argue that this is not always true, and that individuals under the veil of ignorance would agree to what maximises overall utility. Instead of 100 swimmers and 50 passengers, in the case where the Hardin’s model is composed of 100 and 50 refugees, Harsanyi claims that rational individuals would take risk and deviate from the difference principles, therefore be less inclined and incentivised to provide for the swimmers.
4.5. Criticism to 4.4.’s response
Nevertheless, while Harsanyi posits that uncertainty is sufficient to prevent action, he overlooks the subtle distinction between uncertainty and ignorance. Under the veil of ignorance, individuals are also excluded from the knowledges of the risks they are taking. Those under the veil do not have access to information on their probability of being the swimmer of the passenger. This reclaims Rawls' original argument that under the veil of ignorance, individuals will still consider the worst outcome and maximise its value, as they are completely unaware of any information that would led them otherwise.
This supports the argument for offering a certain degree of foreign assistance, as individuals would try to ensure the protection towards refugees, providing them with the rights that ensures their basic rights and freedom. The protection of fundamental rights is a rational and reasonable approach in creating a just society, based on the reversed mechanism Rawls proposes. This ensures and protects equality in the future, even when the veil is lifted.
PART 5 Countries’ capacity
5.1. Summary
Hardin’s notion that humanitarian assistance over-corrects distribution of resources and therefore leads to unwanted externalities presents humanitarian aid as a rigid, “all-or-nothing”55 option. This is a narrowed view because which fails to consider humanitarian assistance as a spectrum that capture aid in all degrees and forms.
5.2. Hardin’s Argument – Externalities of increasing carrying capacity
While Hardin considered the possibility of increasing carrying capacity of the lifeboat, he ultimately claims that increasing carrying capacity will not benefit the country. This is because increase in carrying capacity of certain aspects, such as food, would lead to negative externalities or spill-over effects. He believes that the more assistance provided by assistant nations, the larger the external input required. As a result, these negative externalities can further the destruction our beneficiaries and “decrease its per capital supply of the other resources needed by men”56. These negative externalities will prolong and encourage the rachet effect as mentioned in previous sections, where providing humanitarian assistance would result in a “pejoristic rachet system”57 which disturbs the self-correcting cycle of overpopulation.
To prove the undesirability of increase in capacity, Hardin referred to India’s increasing population and the possible impacts of extending assistance. Namely, given how the India population already “puts a huge load on a relatively impoverished environment”58, he posits that providing assistance will only lead put extra burden on the already stressful situation, as well as “increase the economic and social costs of crowding”59. This is because while a nation can easily offer one aspect of living to the refugees, such as “medical or nutritional assistance”60, the person whose life has been sustained would now have to fulfil his other needs of living. This would require further deterioration of their already-stressful resources and have adverse effect to the welfare of not only others, but also the person himself, since he has “decrease[d] the per capita supply of the other resources needed by other men”61.
Therefore, for the purpose of this essay, Hardin might argue that in light of possible and unexpected externalities, Hong Kong should guard itself against providing assistance towards refugees. This is because although the act of admitting refugees may not be costly, the city’s might nonetheless suffer from the continuous support of refugees, and therefore diluting resources outside of the general protection of refugees.
5.3. Criticism (1)
The argument above ignores claims that nations may be willing and able to provide for refugees. Where this is true, and countries have in fact sufficient resources, it might be in Hardin’s interest to support the refugees, especially considering the possibility that assistance can in fact control overpopulation. With reference to previous references on ethical egoism views, one may even argue that universal egoists as Harbin should therefore be morally obliged to offer humanitarian assistance as it will be in his interest to do so.
According to the child-survival hypothesis62, the high fertility in many rapidly growing underdeveloped countries, such as India, is a result of “parents’ wishes to have a certain number of their children who survive their own old age”63. It therefore follows that if one increases the chance of child survival by improved standard of living, medical care and nutrition, few pregnancies and births will be necessary in securing the desired size of the family. Under Hardin’s ethical egoist perspective, the child-survival hypothesis may be construed as something that can benefit the interests of non-refugees, because it can in theory resolve the overpopulation problem by improving the quality of life thereby correcting reproductive objectives, and lowering birth-rates. Therefore, where the outcome benefits one’s interests, namely the control of overpopulation, Hardin would find offering humanitarian assistance a morally justifiable view under his ethical egotistical views.
Hardin assumes that nations are scarce in all areas, and therefore the increase in capacity in one will lead to insufficiencies in others, because countries tend to over-correct in a specific area, such as food, and thus tax the other areas, such as natural resources. While this is true, it ignores claims that in fact, some areas are more scarce than others. In the case where a nation targets certain scarce areas and increase the capacity with measured assessment, there will be no over-correction and thus no “pejoristic rachet system”64.
5.4. Criticism (2)
Another criticism towards Hardin’s original argument concerns his rigid application of humanitarian assistance, which fails to consider the cooperative nature of lifeboats, and suggests “all-or-nothing” approach to humanitarian aid. Namely, humanitarian assistance is not a yes-or-no question, but a spectrum that encapsulates all ranges and forms of assistance.
Suppose Jeff Benzos and a regular university student see a hungry orphan and wish to help him. Under Hardin’s stream of logic, both Jeff Benzos and the student should not do so because feeding the orphan would be a long-term burden, since letting the child eat and survive would lead to other responsibilities and costs, when supporting his education, housing, and medical fees. This has two problems. First, it assumes that both Benzos and the student are of equal footing in terms of financial capabilities. This disregard of the actual capabilities is significant, because to Benzos, he is more than capable to support the orphan. This is significant in the theory of humanitarian aid, because in reality, nations are able to adjust their degree of assistance depending on their capabilities. The second problem stems from an “all-or-nothing” approach, namely the assumption that only two options are available: To be fully responsible for the child’s welfare and well-being, or to not help at all. In reality, the university student can help the orphan by offering his knowledge, while Benzos can offer his financial assistance. This collaborative element is important because it refutes the assumption that “there is no relation between the lifeboats”65.
Therefore, while this notion does not demerit Hardin’s view, it finds it an incomplete and narrowed perception towards the modes and degrees of humanitarian assistance. Namely, beyond Hardin’s limited option of a) not helping at all, and b) being responsibl for and suffering from unattained negative externalities, this argument proposes that humanitarian assistance is a spectrum that offers a range of degree and forms of assistance, depending on a nation’s capability. In the context of humanitarian assistance, this spectrum may capture not only a variety of financial assistance, but also various forms of assistance.
PART 6 Alternative theory: Singer’s famine relief argument
Hardin’s lifeboat ethic is significantly based on the idea of scarcity and limited resources furthered by overpopulation. These arguments are reasonable to the extent where these concerns are indisputable, and especially valid in a nation who can barely sustain themselves. However, especially with reference to criticisms concerning a nation’s capacity, the problem is not the lack of, but the unequal distribution of resources on a global scale. This is particularly true, considering the world’s top 1% wealthiest people often capture most of the world’s personal wealth.
As an alternative theory, Singer’s famine relief argument can perhaps provide ample insight on what a resourceful nation can and should morally obliged to do when the problem does not necessarily lie merely in limited resource.
Philosophises such as Singer, may argue that when there is a reasonable probability that “population can be brought under control without such horrors”66, nations ought to act upon them to prevent “absolute poverty without sacrificing anything of “comparable moral significance”67. For instance, in the case of the lifeboat, where passengers know of a reasonable probability for saving the swimmers, the moral significance of reserving 10 extra seats for budgeting and the immediate life of the 10 swimmers would be compared according to their moral significance.
Under Singer’s famine relief argument, where 1) there is a reasonable probability that assistance would make an impact, and 2) a nation is able to cover the externalities to the extent that does not compromise anything of moral significance, it should offer its assistance.68 In the context of Hong Kong, to the refugees, being able to leave their country could very well be a life-or-death situation. By means of careful assessment and calculation, an alternative from the non-assistance method would therefore be for Hong Kong to assist in a way that does not compromise anything that is of moral significance. This will involve an assessment of the breadth and degree of humanitarian assistance, as well as a careful consideration of the depth of the aid.
For example, while Hong Kong’s land problem renders the city unsuitable for taking in long-term refugees, it may opt to set up complementary pathways for admission69, which is a relocation service intended to help refugees lawfully stay in a third country. It may also provide a well-assessed degree of financial assistance given the city’s advantageous financial position. Other forms of humanitarian assistance can also include legal training of overseas human rights lawyers and the creation of a global network of legal support. While this is not an exhaustive list of suggestions, it is definitely an area of significance in the future assessments concerning Hong Kong’s refugee framework.
PART 7 Conclusion
In light of Hong Kong’s past and current efforts towards its refugee framework, this paper seeks to question: To what extent is Garrett Hardin’s lifeboat ethics model desirable in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee system? In proving the above notion, this paper assesses Hardin’s views on humanitarian aid from Hardin’s views concerning1) one’s moral accountability to provide humanitarian aid, 2) the outcomes of humanitarian aid, and 3) nations’ ability to provide humanitarian aid. It argues that on the first level, Hardin provides an incomplete and preferential view, as it only considers refugees to be the cause, and not a product of the exploitation of common resources. On the second level, Hardin also provides limited insight on his ethical egoistic view, by failing to take into account the possibility where humanitarian assistance doesn’t compromise, but actually furthers one’s benefits. On the third level, Hardin’s renders his notion incomplete as he fails to encapsulate the flexible breadth and depth of humanitarian assistance. This paper subsequently offers an evaluative discussion to the notion which looks beyond Hardin’s concern over scarcity and suggests that the real issue lies in the unequal distribution of resource. It does so through a discussion and application Peter Singer’s argument on humanitarian assistance, as a possible way of addressing Hardin’s incomplete arguments.
Ultimately, this paper is of the view that Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, which supports the act of not assisting refugees, is only desirable to the extent, where it provides a logical but limited insight on the breadth and depth of humanitarian assistance. Beyond Hardin’s either-or approach, Hong Kong should therefore consider its humanitarian efforts in a more complete spectrum that truly encapsulates the versatility and possibilities humanitarian aid has to offer.
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