Ethics and Philosophy: An Evaluation of the “Do Not Harm” Principle

In this paper, I briefly characterise and analyse the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle. I argue that while this view is attractive under our normal understanding of harm, it neglects the possibility of subconsciously harming oneself. While one argues that harm to oneself is consensual, this view is ultimately unattractive as it fails to explain how one can consent to subconscious harm.  

The view says that thoughts cannot and do not violate the “do not harm without the person’s consent” principle. Before exploring its advantages and disadvantages, this view will have to spell out a number of crucial details.  

First of all, why should we care about the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle? Before we answer that, we must first make clear of what do we mean by thoughts. For the purpose of this essay, “thought” does not mean any idea generated by thinking in the minds. By thoughts, I mean ideas generated by thinking in our minds that are disconnected from actions. This includes ideas independent of our actions, meaning they are never executed. In this essay, we will refer these ideas as bad thoughts, because executing that those thoughts will cause detriment to another. 

Generally, there are two levels to our thoughts – initial thoughts, and subsequent thoughts. By initial thoughts, I mean thoughts that arise by itself, and thoughts that are not derived from any previous thoughts. Subsequent thoughts, on the other hand, are conscious expansion of bad thoughts, derived by initial thoughts of harm. When one possesses subsequent harmful thoughts, he knows that the initial thought is harmful.   

Consider the case where I am sitting a boring Math lecture and I suddenly think “what if I knock my professor down?” This is an initial thought that comes to my mind without any prior thoughts. Knowing the consequences and sanctions I will get from knocking my professor down, I decide not to act it out. However, I spend my whole lecture visualising myself knocking my professor down. These are subsequent thoughts, as I consciously let these thoughts entertain me, knowing that they are bad thoughts. I know they are bad thoughts, because if acted out, the physical detriment is harmful to my professor.  

For the purpose of this essay, we will only consider subsequent thoughts that are disconnected from actions, because of an important distinction between initial and subsequent thoughts. Initial thoughts are often unconsciously produced, meaning they are not under out conscious moral control. We therefore do not know if they are morally assessible. On the other hand, subsequent thoughts, since they are consciously produced and processed, are morally assessible. Thus, subsequent thoughts that are disconnected from actions are the only kinds of thoughts considered in this essay.  

Now that we know what we mean by thoughts, we can finally ask: why should we care about the view that thoughts do not violate the “do not harm” principle? In our daily lives, we often encounter bad thoughts. On one hand, it seems that bad thoughts are not morally wrong, because they are not connected to action. When I think about pinching my friend but refrain from doing so, I am not harming anyone in an intuitive sense. On the other hand, some thoughts can be very morally repulsive. When we hear them, we want to condemn whoever possesses these thoughts for merely having these thoughts, even if they are disconnected from our actions. Consider a person who fantasises about raping children but never acts upon these fantasises. We would think that this person should receive legal sanction, or at least rehabilitation just for having these thoughts, because they are so morally outrageous that we simply cannot leave him alone.   

This, hence, makes this essay an interesting investigation, because we can find an answer through a deontologist’s view. The point and purpose of this essay is to figure out how a deontologist would answer whether bad thoughts violate the “do not harm” principle. In deontology, the “do not harm” principle is one of the two moral principles of deontological moral systems. Given that it is a useful philosophical theory on attempting to maximise welfare, it is interesting to explore how bad thoughts interact with the “do not harm” principle in deontology.  

So, what counts as doing harm? Before defining what harm is, we must explain what it does not mean. In the context of this essay, harm is not equivalent to crime, because not all kinds of harm are criminalized. Generally, there is a liberal definition to things that cause harm. This includes events that cause detriment to someone if and only if it makes her worse than she would have otherwise been. This means harm is an imposition that causes undesirable detriment or unwanted suffering to another person. Harm can be understood as the undesirable effect in our minds induced by a series of stimuli, and it is important for the intended receiver of harm to be able to possess these stimuli, in order to observe the harm and undesirable effect in our minds. For example, in order to cause harm, when I pinch my friend, he would have to have detest or oppose to the harm I inflict upon him.  

If harm is an undesirable effect in our minds, then what qualifies as undesirable? If an act is undesired by the person receiving the harm, the person is receiving unwanted actions towards him. This means he does not consent to the harm imposed on him, and it would hence be impermissible to harm. Therefore, the permissibility to harm is indicative by a person’s consent, or lack thereof. This means that the do not harm principle is followed by a specification, that one must do not harm without another’s consent. This also means that it is impossible to harm when there is consent, hence consensual harm doesn’t exist. We will proceed with this essay by referring to such harm as consensual suffering.  

Here are some examples of consensual suffering. For example, in contact sports, such as rugby, a person is voluntarily putting him/herself into the situation where the goal is to successfully tackle the opponent physically. Physical tackling techniques can lead to physical detriments to another person, such as bruising to one’s eye. The injuries and pain a professional rugby player suffers amount to harm. However, these injuries are consensual and are considered permissible in our daily lives. Also consider the case of massage. When I receive a massage, the massager is kneading parts of my body in order to relief the tension of my muscles. The kneading of my body can cause discomfort and even pain, but I am consenting someone to intentionally inflict physical discomfort on me. This would be a permissible type of harm as it is consensual. An example of consensual harm would be firing a rubber band at my high school nemesis in class, knowing that she would not consent to such harm, also knowing that she would receive physical and mental discomfort from my act.  

An advantage of this view is its alignment to our normal understanding of harm. By normal understanding of harm, I do not mean harm in a legal context, which not only includes physical harm, but also specific kinds of harm such as damage to reputation or dignity. By normal understanding of harm, I mean causing another to suffer physically or mentally, where harm is unwanted by the sufferer. This includes but is not limited to the infliction of physical pain or mental detriment like anger. 

As characterised previously, harm is an imposition that causes undesirable detriment to another person who does not want to be harmed. If a person’s bad thoughts are disconnected from actions, there are no external consequences from the person’s bad thoughts. The intended receiver of the harm can only be affected, either if the thought is executed and there are external consequences, or he becomes aware of the thinker’s thoughts, and feels discomforted. Since there are no external consequences because the thinker never does anything, the intended receiver of the harm or victim of the thought can never be aware of the bad thoughts. Therefore, the intended receiver of harm is not affected, as the thought is neither executed nor made aware of.  

This understanding aligns with our intuitive understanding of harm, which proposes that if the thought produces no external consequence, and the intended receiver of harm does not know about the thoughts, he is not affected. When a thought crosses my mind, the status and state of the intended recipient of harm remains unchanged and unaffected. Under our normal and intuitive understanding of harm, this intended recipient is not actually harmed. For example, if I punch my friend in the face, I will be inflicting physical harm as well as causing him to be angry, which is a form of mental harm. However, suppose I only think about punching him in the face. I do not act upon it and I make sure he doesn’t know about my thoughts. Then, I will have nothing more than a bad thought. Assume that he has never been punched by me and does not know about my thought. As long as I do not actually punch my friend, he will not appreciate the risk of me hurting him. There is, hence, nothing for him to experience. This cannot be harm, because I did not actually inflict the physical pain from punching on him.  

This is an advantageous and desirable view, especially in our daily lives, because it seems to get the right results in many cases. If I think of killing someone but never acts upon it, no harm is inflicted upon that person. It is only harmful if I actually stab that person to death, assuming pain and death is intrinsically bad. This would, then, suggest that my stabbing is harmful to him. This converges with our normal understanding of harm. The convergence is desirable because we want a view to align with our common understanding of morality.  

However, the previous view seems off by saying that mere thoughts can do no harm at all. The previous view has only considered harm to others when there is, in fact, harm to oneself. A person can harm himself with bad thoughts, which are undesirable thoughts of inflicting harm to others. In short, indulgence of harmful thoughts can impede our ability to make correct moral judgements and to receive moral truths. This is because if my access to moral facts is hindered, I cannot receive correct and comprehensive moral truths; because I cannot receive good moral truths, I am not able to act according to these truths, which would prevent me from making correct moral judgements. This counts as our own undesirable detriment and hence is considered harm.  

So how do thoughts impede our ability to make correct moral judgements and to receive moral truths? Suppose Tom loves watching violent movies. He very often fantasises killing his kindergarten nemesis with ways he has seen in the movies. He never acts upon his fantasies but he entertains himself with these thoughts by picturing them very graphically. Usually, a normal rational person would be disgusted by the graphic display of stabbing a person to death. However, as Tom thinks about killing his nemesis all the time, his perception of the killing is desensitised. This means if he was given a knife, he would feel less revulsion compared to a normal rational person, and might even be tempted to stab his nemesis, thinking that perhaps this is not as bad as it seems. The previous argument would argue that up until this point, no actual harm is done, since these are merely Tom’s thoughts, and he hasn’t actually killed his kindergarten nemesis. However, this is actually harmful to Tom himself. This is harmful because his perception of morality has been impaired, by being desensitised from his indulgence in killing fantasies. This prevents him from receiving accurate moral information, which is that killing is bad and we should be morally revolted by it. If Tom cannot receive accurate moral information, it is difficult for him to make correct moral choices in the future, because he will base his actions off an inaccurate moral compass.  

Consider our moral intuitions as a kind of perceptive faculty. Much like how our sense experience is a form of faculty of sensibility that perceives the world, our moral intuition is a form of faculty for moral intuition that perceives moral truths. By constantly indulging in bad thoughts, one’s ability to perceive moral truth will be distorted. This will malignantly hinder our moral faculty. Therefore, bad thoughts can still harm, in a way that the thinker, by entertaining himself with these thoughts, can lose touch of the real word, and hence lose the ability to perceive the moral world. This will prevent them from getting accurate moral information. Ultimately, it will be harder for them to do the right thing as their perceptive faculty has been impaired. That, in and of itself, is harmful to the thinker. Harm is previously defined as unwanted detriment to a person. Ruining a perceptive faculty is considered harmful. After all, if taking one’s eyeballs out and ruining his faculty of vision is a form of suffering and harmful, ruining one’s faculty for moral intuition is also considered harmful. 

Thus, the previous argument that thoughts cannot harm is undesirable, because it fails to include all consequences of an act. If doesn’t take into account harm to oneself, which is a highly probable consequence from having bad thoughts. This is unattractive because we want a theory that encapsulates all possible consequences of an act.  

Prima facie, the previous view does make sense in saying that one can cause detriment to self by having thoughts of imposing harm to others. However, does the purported self-harm constitute as actual harm? Perhaps not. In fact, one might suggest that it is impossible to harm oneself, since self-harm is always consensual. It is important to note that one must not equate consent to desire, which is a term indicative of strong approval and preference. While desire can be a precondition to consent, consent does not necessary have to be derived from desire. Suppose I am a wrestler. In a match, I must consent to physical harm inflected by my opponent. However, I do not desire getting punched. I consent to it, because it is inevitable and it helps me win the match, not because I desire the harm.  

When executing an action, the action must first be processed through our minds. Our brain would have to consent to us to harm in order for our bodies to execute the action of inflicting a harmful act. This is a decision one makes consensually. Given our definition of harm, harm has to be unwanted. If a person doesn’t want something, she would not consent to it. Our freedom to consent and choose what we think is best for us according to reason is sufficient to amount to consent. If consensual harm isn’t harm, it is never possible for a person to harm himself.  

Hence, if we make a choice, it implies that the choice is consensual. By deciding to proceed to pinching myself, I have made the choice of consenting myself to pinch. It would be, hence, permissible for me to inflict the discomfort and impossible for me to harm myself, as I have consented to my own actions.  

However, the previous response seems to be flawed, as it overlooks the subtle distinction between consenting to an act and consenting to its effects and consequences, as the two are not, in fact, the same. The previous view says that as long as I have consented to receiving detriments, there is no harm. Usually this is a sound view – I pay to have a new tattoo, knowing that it would hurt or possibly get infected. The view says that no harm is imposed on me because it is I have consented to it. However, this might seem bizarre in other cases. Suppose I will undergo a risky surgery. The previous view says that as long as I have consented the surgery, the surgery itself can never be harmful. Suppose the doctor did not inform me of all he risks of the surgery, and I do not know that the surgery will have the likely effect of me getting an infection. Is there still no harm? Perhaps not.  

Consent can and should only be made if the consenter is fully informed of the possible likely consequences of an act. By possible likely consequences, I do not mean consequences with chances so slim that we do not need to know about. I only mean consequences that are probable enough that I should be aware of. Therefore, in order to consent to the act of thinking bad thoughts, the person must understand that the act of thinking bad thoughts will have the likely effect of corrupting her faculty of perceiving moral truths. Suppose person A entertains herself with bad thoughts all the time. She seems to be consenting and allowing herself to have the bad thoughts. However, she is not consenting to undermining her perceptive faculty, which is a subconscious effect. For person A to consent to an act, person A must have a reasonable understanding of the likely consequences of having bad thoughts.  

Often times, the likely effect of corrupting one’s faculty of perceiving moral truths is unknown and subconscious to the thinker, making it an almost impossible consequence to consent to. Since the effect of the harm usually goes unnoticed, the reason for the corruption of moral intuition is unknown. Person A cannot be aware of her impairment in moral intuition, which is the effect. Therefore, if person A is not aware of the impairment, there is no way of knowing the reason behind the corruption of her moral intuition.  

Technically, it is not impossible to consent to the impairment of moral intuition. Person A can seek help from a psychologist or therapist, who would explain to her the detrimental effects bad thoughts can have. She will, then, be informed of the consequences and can hence consent. However, in paradigmatic situations, we do not go to a therapist, nor do we understand the risks behind having bad thoughts. This is because we are not aware of the detrimental effects we are experiencing from the bad thoughts.  

Thus, given how hard and unusual it is to consent to one’s impairment of moral intuition, person A is not fully informed of possible consequences, and hence cannot fully appreciate the risks from the act of thinking bad thoughts. Therefore, person A does not and cannot consent to the “harm” of corrupting her faculty of perceiving moral truths. Because of this, this “harm” would still count as harm technically, and will then fall under the domain of the deontological principle “do not harm”.  

When a person seems to be consenting to the act of harming, it is very unlikely for her to actually be consenting. This is because she cannot give consent to start with, since the effects are subconscious and unknown to her. The previous response is flawed and undesirable, because it doesn’t give an accurate account to human nature, and overlooks the subtle distinction between consenting to an act and consenting to its effects and consequences. Sometimes we lose grip on our unconscious thoughts, which are impossible to give consent to. 

Garrett Hardin’s lifeboat ethics model in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee system

PART 1 Introduction

Given the city’s abundance of resources and longstanding history of immigration, it is hardly a wonder why Hong Kong has been such a perennial magnet for refugees seeking sanctuary. However, beneath the continental, prosperous surface, the metropolis remains to be one of the slowest cities when it comes to processing refugee claims, with the lowest degree of refugee claim acceptance.  

Following a Court of Final Appeal ruling in 2013, Hong Kong currently operated under government-led screening mechanism called the Unified Screening Mechanism1 (USM). From claims based on risk of return to persecution to torture claims, allegations of various nature are categorised as non-refoulment claims and assessed collectively under the USM. 2 Since 2004, only less than 0.4 percent of applications has been deemed substantiated, which is far lower than the global average of 30 per cent and European average of 60 per cent. On top of the arguably disproportionate ratio of claims processing to claims acceptance, Hong Kong also prohibits its asylum seekers from working while their claims are being processed. Based on this brief overview of the system, it becomes clear why Hong Kong’s current refugee framework has attracted as much attention from local NGOs and international entities as it has, which will be elaborated later in the body of this essay.  

Recently, the Immigration Department has proposed amendments to current regulations which have drawn criticisms from multiples legal bodies. Many proposed items seek to “fast track current procedures”3, by introducing policies such as the early removal of rejected claimants. A few of the most notable critics amongst the legal bodies rejecting these policy amendments are perhaps the Hong Kong Law Society and Hong Kong Bar Association: the former blast the Immigration Department for lack of jurisdiction in sending home claimants that have already lodged legal challenges, and the latter found the proposals to be “seriously compromising [to] the fairness of the decision-making process”4. As a consequence, the aforementioned issues with Hong Kong’s controversial refugee policies not only attracted considerable – and conceivably deserved – public attention, but furthermore raised a multitude of questions, particularly concerning the moral obligations and degree of accountability Hong Kong possesses regarding such a sensitive dilemma that will ultimately affect more than just Hong Kong’s egocentric fears. 

In light of current the above debates, this paper seeks to explore the desirability of  Hardin’s lifeboat ethics theory in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee framework. It does so first by examining the lifeboat ethics theory, which holds that resourceful nations are not and should not be ethically responsible for providing humanitarian aid to other nations. Subsequently, it questions whether Hong Kong should adopt Hardin’s model, by assessing Hardin’s views on humanitarian aid on three levels: 1) on one’s moral accountability to provide humanitarian aid, 2) on the outcomes of humanitarian aid, and 3) on nations’ ability to provide humanitarian aid.   

The first level concerns Hardin’s view that one lacks of moral accountability towards providing humanitarian aid due to the tragedy of the commons. It is an incomplete view, as it only considers refugees as a cause of the tragedy of the commons, and fails to consider them as a product of it. The second level concerns Hardin’s view that  providing aid leads to detrimental outcomes at the expense of one’s self-interest. It is a narrowed view on ethical egoism, because it sees the interests of others and that of ours as a necessary trade-off, when in reality and in the context of refugees, some acts of benefitting others can be of our best interest. The third level concerns Hardin’s view that nations are, and will eventually be incapable of providing humanitarian assistance. It is a limited view, because it assumes a fixed output of resources when in fact, humanitarian assistance should be seen as a broad spectrum that encapsulates all types and degree of aid. Further to the analysis of Hardin’s model, the paper also briefly considers an alternative theory, namely Peter Singer’s argument on humanitarian assistance, as a possible way of addressing Hardin’s incomplete arguments.  

Therefore, this paper is of the view that Hardin’s lifeboat ethics is only desirable to the extent, where it portrays humanitarian assistance in a rather narrowed and incomplete ethical egoistic manner, which does not truly reflect the versatility and possibilities of humanitarian aid.  

PART 2 Garett Hardin’s Lifeboat Model 

Hardin’s model of lifeboat ethics revolves around a thought experiment that seeks to encapsulate the dynamic between nations. Specifically, this refers to nations that are able to provide assistance of any nature and nations that can benefit from such assistance. For the purpose of this essay, nations that are able to assist – namely nations that can provide assistance to refugees – will be referred to as assistants from hereon; nations that benefit from the assistance, which are the refugees, will be referred to as beneficiaries. 

Hardin’s metaphor describes a lifeboat possessing 50 occupied seats, with room for only 10 more people. 100 swimmers are “swimming in the water outside, begging for admission”5 to the lifeboat. Figuratively, each assistant represents a lifeboat, whereas the swimmers are refugees who come from “the poor of the world”6, without their own lifeboats and desperate for help. Assuming that the needs and values of all swimmers are the same, this begs the question: what should the lifeboat passengers do? Hardin suggests three possible options: 

1.  Live by the “Christian ideal of being our brother’s keeper”7 and take all 100 swimmers into the lifeboat, since the needs of all swimmers are the same.  

1. Given the excess capacity of 10 more passengers, admit only 10 more swimmers.  

1. Admit no more to the lifeboat.  

Hardin first argues that option 1 is the least desirable, as it means a total of 150 people are somehow meant to survive in a lifeboat designed for 60. This is obviously not possible, and as such, the lifeboat sinks and everyone drowns, resulting in “complete justice, complete catastrophe”8. He proceeds to argue that option 2 is not optimal either; firstly, there is no fair mechanism for anyone to select which 10 swimmers can be admitted, considering the needs and values of all swimmers are identical. Furthermore, to extend upon the reasoning for option 1’s impracticality, filling the lifeboat completely would mean losing the “safety factor”9, which refers to the engineering principle of ensuring a system's structural capacity is viable beyond its expected or actual loads – for example, nations leaving room for excess capacity in order to combat unexpected natural disasters. In light of the undesirability of options 1 and 2, Hardin eventually suggests option 3 as the lesser evil and thus the solution, claiming that “our survival is then possible although we shall have to be constantly on guard against boarding parties”10. In other words, if we were to follow Hardin’s philosophy, no nation should assist others, nor are they or should they be obliged to. 

PART 3 Argument: Moral accountability  

3.1. Summary  

The blanket statement that is Hardin’s argument for the tragedy of the commons is undesirable as presupposes the demoralization of charity and fails to consider the tragedy of the commons on a macro-level. This part examines the preceding criticism, posits that a moral obligation to assist refugees does in fact exist, and questions the extent to which resourceful nations should possess a moral obligation in regards to refugees.  

3.2. Hardin’s Argument: The tragedy of the commons 

Hardin asserts that countries should not provide direct financial assistance to countries in need due to the tragedy of the commons, which will lead to a deterioration of resources as a whole. 

Before assessing how the tragedy of the commons supports the act of not providing assistance – and subsequently, Hardin’s argument – it is important to first examine the concept of the tragedy of the commons. In short, the theory refers to the exploitation and “misappropriation of common property resources”11. Hardin illustrates this theory with the example of a shepherd: in a pasture with privatised lands owned by individual shepherds, it is both natural and rational for shepherds to increase their herds and maximize profit, as their sense of responsibility – which stems from ownership of the farm – would prompt them to make the most economically sensible choice. However, suppose the pasture becomes “a commons open to all”12 – since the commons is now a natural resource owned by no one, each person’s right to use the land may not be “achieved by a corresponding responsibility to protect it”13. In other words, this means a person can use the entirety of the land without any contribution, which would inevitably destroy one’s incentives to produce and to wisely consume, thereupon accelerating the exhaustion of resources. 

On a macro-level, Hardin argues that humanitarian efforts such as the World Food Bank and Food for Peace program14 are real-life depictions of the tragedy of the commons. Specifically, he posits that the Food for Peace program is nothing but a humanitarian gesture at the expense of taxpayers, and that the World Food Bank will lead to careless depletion of resources until “the world’s food source [is] ruined for everyone”15. He contends that the generosity in liberal immigration policies and humanitarian aids will have a “demoralizing effect on the receiver”16, and that said effect would lead to the destruction of the environment and the world’s ruin for future generations. Considering his description of a “crowded world [consisting] of less than perfect human beings”17, Hardin seems to be suggesting that a nation whose natural resources are open to the larger public will eventually become “a potential target for ruthless overexploitation”18, hence the metaphor of the sinking lifeboat and drowning passengers. These resourceful nations, Hardin rather questionably maintains, “must act as trustees of a civilization that is threatened by… a ruinous breeding race”19. 

3.3. Criticism 

Hardin postulates that charity often has a “demoralizing effect”20 and claims that receivers of aid will exploit common resources; while this proposed possibility regarding the effects of humanitarian aid is certainly logical and entirely plausible, it does, however, present a rather generalised observation that can lead to extreme consequences. 

In reality, there are more than plenty of instances where common pooling of resources can be effectivity mobilized. The studies of Emery Roe and those of Nobel prize-winner Elinor Ostrom successfully demonstrate “fresh ways of thinking about the protection of common property resources”21 through unstated contracts and social rules, to name a few. Hardin’s pessimism towards the possibility of constructive utilization of humanitarian aid therefore presents a technical fallacy in his argument by over-generalizing reality.    

Beyond Hardin’s technical fallacy, there lies a much substantive issue in Hardin’s position. Hardin generalizes humanitarian aid, and prompts nations to not provide any assistance because he finds demoralization to be the general case. Namely, he finds humanitarian aid demoralizing because it encourages individuals to act irresponsibly. This claim disregards the possibility of using humanitarian aid as a stepping-stone in a constructive manner, in order to promote self-sufficiency in less resourceful nations. This implies that all aid worsens problems (including medicine, technology, etc). However, this notion that humanitarian aid worsens problems encourages a “live and let die”22 mentality.  

As mentioned previously, this generalised view can, however, lead to extreme, morally undesirable consequences. Consider this: if food aid such as the World Food Bank only worsens problems, then it can be logically inferred that medical aid should be avoided too, for nations where nourishment is uncertain. It would then follow that other forms of assistance – such as long-term medical expertise and equipment that can improve health services – should likewise be avoided. Therefore, one like Næss would suggest that, according to this “live and let die”23 logic, the most effective solution would perhaps be “a gentle putting to death by means of biochemical mass destruction weapons”24. which justifies the killing for the survival of another. Even if that is true and it is morally justifiable to kill under lifeboat ethics, this view is still undesirable because in its most egregious interpretation, Hardin fails to justify the act of specifically targeting swimmers and choosing to kill them over passengers. The immediate argument that passengers deserve their seats would not stand, since Hardin’s arguments are built on the assumption that “immigrants and native-born citizens are of exactly equal quality”25.  

Therefore, in the context of refugees, Hardin’s notion that humanitarian aid encourages exploitation, and should therefore be stopped can lead to extreme and undesirable results that have yet to be morally justified.  

3.4. Response to criticism 

In response to the previous criticism which posits that failing to assist nations would lead to morally undesirable consequences, Hardin would likely justify such treatment by saying those unfortunate nations should be held accountable for their own actions. This probability is elucidated through his accusations of those nations for being incapable of understanding the significance of budgeting resources because he believes they lack “either the wisdom or the competence, or both”26. 

Accordingly, one may argue that the section 3.3. fails to distinguish between the acts of actively causing harm and simply refusing to be a Good Samaritan. While it is true that some nations are in need of help, this view contends that “each country is solely responsible for its own well-being”27, and therefore resourceful nations should not be held morally accountable or responsible for another nation’s lack of resources. The mere fact that some nations are more resourceful does not necessitate liability or any obligation to provide humanitarian support. Hardin goes one step further to argue that refusing to assist is not harmful, but actually helpful to nations in need; he does so by arguing that nations should “not feed those who suffer from starvation”28. He reasons that, under the theory of lifeboat ethics, if assistants continue to provide humanitarian support, malignant operational consequences will arise as beneficiary countries become increasingly reliant upon their support. In continuing the provision of humanitarian aid, beneficiaries will fail to “learn to mend their ways and will suffer progressively greater emergencies as their populations grow”29, so the act of cutting off humanitarian support should theoretically help beneficiary nations “learn from experience”30 for long-term growth. In less savory, shorter terms, Hardin believes that the act of withholding provision of any humanitarian aid is a means to facilitating the development of the beneficiary nation’s competence. The beneficiaries’ predicaments cannot be blamed on anyone besides themselves and their own incompetence, and as a result, they should be the only ones responsible for rectifying the state of their respective nations – the non-assistance approach is, according to Hardin, by all means a blessing in disguise for the beneficiaries. 

3.5. Criticism to 3.4’s response 

Aside from the ludicrous nature of Hardin’s case, even if we do follow his previous line of reasoning and base moral responsibility on accountability, one can still argue that refugees are a product of the tragedy of the commons on a global scale, which effectively incriminates all nations and subsequently makes them all accountable and responsible for providing humanitarian aid. In today’s environmental landscape, “climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements”31, a collective product of all nations; these events of nature’s degradation have further “limited our natural resources, such as drinking water”32, and have produced a group of climate refugees forced to leave their homeland. As powerful countries continue to sustain their power by industrialisation, nations who are less competitive are left with limited access to common resources, such as clean air, fresh water, and more. As highlighted by Paavole, this circumstance is exemplified through common access to atmospheric sinks, which are natural reservoirs for the storage of greenhouse gases such as forests. Paavole calls this the ultimate tragedy of the commons, as these reservoirs can be accessed by any user “before other users make them unavailable”33, and as the tragedy of the commons predicted, the “weak restraint to conserve”34 the sinks have ultimately caused nations to exhaust them. Ergo, nations who fail to reach for these atmospheric sinks before others will therefore produce victims of climate change. In light of Paavole’s arguments, it can be seen why instead of being the cause, refugees should be seen as the product of the tragedy of the commons instead. And as mentioned, if Hardin’s logic were presupposed to be true, then resourceful nations should still be held responsible and offer humanitarian assistance as they are still nevertheless accountable for the refugee problem.   

Extending this thread of thinking to the context of refugees in Hong Kong, it can therefore be concluded that even with all things considered, Hong Kong still has a moral obligation to refugees all the same. The question now, then, is to what degree Hong Kong possesses this moral obligation, and to what extent they should extend their aid.  

PART 4 Argument: Ethical Egoism 

4.1. Summary Hardin’s claims on ethical egoism are undesirable, because they posit the limited view that self-interested individuals the only way to benefit oneself at another’s expense, when in fact, the act of offering humanitarian aid can be an act to benefit oneself. In reality, this will be true to the extent where a nation chooses to benefit itself through maximally risk aversion by guaranteeing the basic, fundamental rights of all.  

4.2. Hardin’s Argument: Overpopulation and scarcity 

Hardin posits that as his lifeboat model reaches its eventual and final state, if one is confronted with the option of giving up his seat for the swimmer or not give up his seat at all, no one would sacrifice their seat for any the swimmers.  

As previously discussed, Hardin first posits our survival is made possible by being “constantly on guard against boarding parties”35. This means the “only means of [the passengers’] survival”36 is to have all passengers agree to not board any swimmer. This is an ethically egoistic view because it maintains that “everyone ought to look after his own interests and to disregard those of other people except in so far as their interests contribute towards his own”37. 

Nonetheless, he recognizes that initially some passengers may feel guilty because they think they are only on the lifeboat by being lucky. This “guilt-ridden conscience”38 will thus make the same passengers feel compelled to assist the swimmers. However, Hardin subsequently posits that in those cases, those who are guilt-ridden should simply “get out and yield [their] place to others”39. Similarly, in the case where a swimmer feels guilty for climbing up the boat and taking a passenger’s spot, the swimmer should not climb up the lifeboat at all.  

According to Hardin, this “net result of conscience-stricken people”40 who give up their seat indicates the elimination of “guilt-ridden conscience”41 from the lifeboat. As a result, those who are left on the lifeboat are people who “will not himself feel guilty about his good luck”42; these people are concerned and driven by what benefits themselves, and will not further assist any new incoming swimmer so long as 50 out of 60 seats are filled . This is because those with a guilt-ridden conscience have already been eliminated, either by jumping off the lifeboat or being unwilling to climb up the lifeboat.  

One implication we can draw from Hardin’s claim, therefore, is that the only way an individual with a guilt-ridden conscience can relief himself of his guilt, is to trade himself for the swimmer, because the interest of the swimmer fails to “contribute towards his own”43. Under this ethical egoistic model, one must choose his interests over another where their interests are in conflict. Therefore, because there are limited seats and resources, passengers will have to forego his interests, namely his seat and his life, to effectively assist the swimmers. This implies an antagonistic nature between the interests of the assistant and beneficiary.  

Further, Hardin explains his theory by applying this model to the real world, by claiming that one man’s gain is one man’s loss, vice versa. He argues that overpopulation and scarcity are to blame for the trade-off between interests of the assistant and that of the beneficiary. Namely, resources are limited, and individuals must compete over these resources. Overpopulation therefore worsens this problem, by introducing more individuals to compete for the same amount of resources. By satisfying a growing population’s need, one is forgoing another’s desire. In such a society, where resources are scarce and limited, one must give up their resources to benefit the other. This echoes the previous paragraph, which reinforces the antagonistic nature between the interests of the assistant and beneficiary. According to Hardin, immigration therefore “speeds up the destruction of rich countries”44 who hold much of that limited resources, because it “moves [refugees] to the food”45, at the expense of rich nations. Therefore, Hardin argues that self-interest-based nations should not offers their resources to refugees. Supporters of this view would contend that in the content of Hong Kong, this non-assistance approach is not without merits. As “one of the most densely populated places in the world”46, land shortage has been plaguing Hong Kong especially in recent years. Specifically, living conditions are characterised by “soaring property prices and rents”47 as well as “overcrowded living space and inadequate community facilities”48. Accepting refugees will therefore increase competition for the already-limited land resources. Therefore, according to Hardin’s theory, the only way for Hong Kong to maintain its resources is to act according to what benefits the city, and stay on the lifeboat.  

4.3. Criticism 

Based on what he believes to be a necessary trade-off between the interest of the assistant to the beneficiary, Hardin argues that “guarding against boarding parties… offers the only means of our survival”49. To him, any lifeboat passenger who is not stricken by guilt, and is concerned with their own interest will not sacrifice their seat for the swimmers, and in doing so, compromise the swimmers’ interests for their own. However, this is not necessarily true for two reasons.  

First, Hardin’s notion is false for the simple fact that often people martyr themselves for others. Self-less acts do in fact happen. Specifically, when one seeks the “heroic, unrewarded sacrifices of martyrs”50, people do in fact fail to conform to the ethic egoistic pursuit to “look after [themselves] and no one else”51. It is important to also note that this desire for selfless sacrifice does not equate to Hardin’s example of the “guilt-ridden conscience”52, as the latter may be motivated by self-interest. This brings us to the second reason.  

Second, even under the realm ethical egoism, Hardin’s view is limited as it only considers possibilities where the interests of the parties are antagonistic. In fact, it is possible to benefit oneself without compromising the interests of others, and this would still be morally justifiable under universal egoism. Consider the Hardin’s model of the guilt-ridden passenger, who has jumped off the boat out of guilt. From the view of a bystander, the passenger fails to consider his best interest, for he is now dead. However, the dead guilt-ridden passenger’s act of jumping of the lifeboat may have been one motivated by his own interest, namely by liberating himself from guilt and therefore benefitting his own character through the act of self-sacrifice. In this case, the dead passenger is able to consider his self-interests while not compromising the swimmer’s interests; if any, he furthered the swimmer’s interests by allowing an extra swimmer to climb up the lifeboat and take his seat.  

Further to the example above, there is also another way of maintaining one’s self-interest while departing from Hardin’s argument, namely the act of securing one’s certainty of survival through maximal risk aversion, since the act of minimising risks benefits oneself. By guaranteeing everyone deserves a minimum and fundamental level of protection, nations are able to benefit themselves by accepting a higher certainty of survival and a lower risk of harm. Specifically, Rawl’s the veil of ignorance effectively demonstrates the idea of maximal risk aversion.  

Under the veil of ignorance, our individual attributes are excluded, therefore our result will be focused on what is just and right. Someone whose identity is excluded under the veil of ignorance, would know that their response can directly affect whatever result they choose, and will adopt a maximin strategy53. In fear of ending up as one of the refugees, the person would be inclined to choose what benefits both the assistant and beneficiary, as it will maximise the chance of the person’s own interests regardless of their position. Therefore, rational and self-interested individuals would be incentivised to find a common denominator by imposing an institution to protect the fundamental rights of the refugees, for example, in the case of political refugees, one that ensures their freedom of expression. This suggests that there are, in fact, ways to offer assistance to refugees without drowning a passenger, or exhausting a nation’s resources. This therefore refutes Hardin’s position that “guarding against boarding parties… offers the only means of our survival”54.  

This notion does not conflict with universal ethical egoism, because it does not involve a trade-off between the interests of different persons; in fact, it is a win-win situation which, in reality, safeguards the fundamental rights of all. Surely, this is not to say that all nations should provide the same kind of minimal humanitarian assistance, or that this should be the only reason why countries should provide humanitarian assistance; rather, it serves to address Hardin’s failure to consider the possibilities, such as the possibility where one’s interest is not secured at another’s expense.  

4.4. Response to criticism 

In response to the above criticism, one may argue that Rawls’ veil of ignorance is not always mutually beneficial because one will not indefinitely risk averse.  

Rawls' veil of ignorance presupposes that everyone will be incentivised to act rationally and according to the maximin strategy. Under this strategy, the higher the stakes, the more likely an individual will try to maximise the minimum outcome. In risk aversion, one would opt for lower returns and higher certainty, over higher returns with lower certainty. Rawls seems to suggest that no matter what the stakes are, rational individuals always choose to maximally risk averse. However, Rawls' assumption does not always prevail, and an indeterminate degree of risk aversion does not exist. Surely, rational individuals may choose to maximally risk averse, under what Hardin considers the reproductive difference between the [assistant] nations and [beneficiary] nations, which refers to the comparatively rapid rate of reproduction in refugee nations. Namely, if the rational person behind the veil is informed that there is double the refugees as there is non-refugees, the rational person will allow foreign assistance and choose to implement fundamental rights protection. However, Nobel prize-winner John Harsanyi would argue that this is not always true, and that individuals under the veil of ignorance would agree to what maximises overall utility. Instead of 100 swimmers and 50 passengers, in the case where the Hardin’s model is composed of 100 and 50 refugees, Harsanyi claims that rational individuals would take risk and deviate from the difference principles, therefore be less inclined and incentivised to provide for the swimmers. 

4.5. Criticism to 4.4.’s response 

Nevertheless, while Harsanyi posits that uncertainty is sufficient to prevent action, he overlooks the subtle distinction between uncertainty and ignorance. Under the veil of ignorance, individuals are also excluded from the knowledges of the risks they are taking. Those under the veil do not have access to information on their probability of being the swimmer of the passenger. This reclaims Rawls' original argument that under the veil of ignorance, individuals will still consider the worst outcome and maximise its value, as they are completely unaware of any information that would led them otherwise.  

This supports the argument for offering a certain degree of foreign assistance, as individuals would try to ensure the protection towards refugees, providing them with the rights that ensures their basic rights and freedom. The protection of fundamental rights is a rational and reasonable approach in creating a just society, based on the reversed mechanism Rawls proposes. This ensures and protects equality in the future, even when the veil is lifted.  

PART 5 Countries’ capacity  

5.1. Summary 

Hardin’s notion that humanitarian assistance over-corrects distribution of resources and therefore leads to unwanted externalities presents humanitarian aid as a rigid, “all-or-nothing”55 option. This is a narrowed view because which fails to consider humanitarian assistance as a spectrum that capture aid in all degrees and forms.  

5.2. Hardin’s Argument – Externalities of increasing carrying capacity  

While Hardin considered the possibility of increasing carrying capacity of the lifeboat, he ultimately claims that increasing carrying capacity will not benefit the country. This is because increase in carrying capacity of certain aspects, such as food, would lead to negative externalities or spill-over effects. He believes that the more assistance provided by assistant nations, the larger the external input required. As a result, these negative externalities can further the destruction our beneficiaries and “decrease its per capital supply of the other resources needed by men”56. These negative externalities will prolong and encourage the rachet effect as mentioned in previous sections, where providing humanitarian assistance would result in a “pejoristic rachet system”57 which disturbs the self-correcting cycle of overpopulation.  

To prove the undesirability of increase in capacity, Hardin referred to India’s increasing population and the possible impacts of extending assistance. Namely, given how the India population already “puts a huge load on a relatively impoverished environment”58, he posits that providing assistance will only lead put extra burden on the already stressful situation, as well as “increase the economic and social costs of crowding”59. This is because while a nation can easily offer one aspect of living to the refugees, such as “medical or nutritional assistance”60, the person whose life has been sustained would now have to fulfil his other needs of living. This would require further deterioration of their already-stressful resources and have adverse effect to the welfare of not only others, but also the person himself, since he has “decrease[d] the per capita supply of the other resources needed by other men”61.  

Therefore, for the purpose of this essay, Hardin might argue that in light of possible and unexpected externalities, Hong Kong should guard itself against providing assistance towards refugees. This is because although the act of admitting refugees may not be costly, the city’s might nonetheless suffer from the continuous support of refugees, and therefore diluting resources outside of the general protection of refugees.  

5.3. Criticism (1)  

The argument above ignores claims that nations may be willing and able to provide for refugees. Where this is true, and countries have in fact sufficient resources, it might be in Hardin’s interest to support the refugees, especially considering the possibility that assistance can in fact control overpopulation. With reference to previous references on ethical egoism views, one may even argue that universal egoists as Harbin should therefore be morally obliged to offer humanitarian assistance as it will be in his interest to do so.  

According to the child-survival hypothesis62, the high fertility in many rapidly growing underdeveloped countries, such as India, is a result of “parents’ wishes to have a certain number of their children who survive their own old age”63. It therefore follows that if one increases the chance of child survival by improved standard of living, medical care and nutrition, few pregnancies and births will be necessary in securing the desired size of the family. Under Hardin’s ethical egoist perspective, the child-survival hypothesis may be construed as something that can benefit the interests of non-refugees, because it can in theory resolve the overpopulation problem by improving the quality of life thereby correcting reproductive objectives, and lowering birth-rates. Therefore, where the outcome benefits one’s interests, namely the control of overpopulation, Hardin would find offering humanitarian assistance a morally justifiable view under his ethical egotistical views.  

Hardin assumes that nations are scarce in all areas, and therefore the increase in capacity in one will lead to insufficiencies in others, because countries tend to over-correct in a specific area, such as food, and thus tax the other areas, such as natural resources. While this is true, it ignores claims that in fact, some areas are more scarce than others. In the case where a nation targets certain scarce areas and increase the capacity with measured assessment, there will be no over-correction and thus no “pejoristic rachet system”64.   

5.4. Criticism (2) 

Another criticism towards Hardin’s original argument concerns his rigid application of humanitarian assistance, which fails to consider the cooperative nature of lifeboats, and suggests “all-or-nothing” approach to humanitarian aid. Namely, humanitarian assistance is not a yes-or-no question, but a spectrum that encapsulates all ranges and forms of assistance.  

Suppose Jeff Benzos and a regular university student see a hungry orphan and wish to help him. Under Hardin’s stream of logic, both Jeff Benzos and the student should not do so because feeding the orphan would be a long-term burden, since letting the child eat and survive would lead to other responsibilities and costs, when supporting his education, housing, and medical fees. This has two problems. First, it assumes that both Benzos and the student are of equal footing in terms of financial capabilities. This disregard of the actual capabilities is significant, because to Benzos, he is more than capable to support the orphan. This is significant in the theory of humanitarian aid, because in reality, nations are able to adjust their degree of assistance depending on their capabilities. The second problem stems from an “all-or-nothing” approach, namely the assumption that only two options are available: To be fully responsible for the child’s welfare and well-being, or to not help at all. In reality, the university student can help the orphan by offering his knowledge, while Benzos can offer his financial assistance. This collaborative element is important because it refutes the assumption that “there is no relation between the lifeboats”65.  

Therefore, while this notion does not demerit Hardin’s view, it finds it an incomplete and narrowed perception towards the modes and degrees of humanitarian assistance. Namely, beyond Hardin’s limited option of a) not helping at all, and b) being responsibl for and suffering from unattained negative externalities, this argument proposes that humanitarian assistance is a spectrum that offers a range of degree and forms of assistance, depending on a nation’s capability. In the context of humanitarian assistance, this spectrum may capture not only a variety of financial assistance, but also various forms of assistance.  

PART 6 Alternative theory: Singer’s famine relief argument 

Hardin’s lifeboat ethic is significantly based on the idea of scarcity and limited resources furthered by overpopulation. These arguments are reasonable to the extent where these concerns are indisputable, and especially valid in a nation who can barely sustain themselves. However, especially with reference to criticisms concerning a nation’s capacity, the problem is not the lack of, but the unequal distribution of resources on a global scale. This is particularly true, considering the world’s top 1% wealthiest people often capture most of the world’s personal wealth. 

As an alternative theory, Singer’s famine relief argument can perhaps provide ample insight on what a resourceful nation can and should morally obliged to do when the problem does not necessarily lie merely in limited resource.  

Philosophises such as Singer, may argue that when there is a reasonable probability that “population can be brought under control without such horrors”66, nations ought to act upon them to prevent “absolute poverty without sacrificing anything of “comparable moral significance”67. For instance, in the case of the lifeboat, where passengers know of a reasonable probability for saving the swimmers, the moral significance of reserving 10 extra seats for budgeting and the immediate life of the 10 swimmers would be compared according to their moral significance.  

Under Singer’s famine relief argument, where 1) there is a reasonable probability that assistance would make an impact, and 2) a nation is able to cover the externalities to the extent that does not compromise anything of moral significance, it should offer its assistance.68 In the context of Hong Kong, to the refugees, being able to leave their country could very well be a life-or-death situation. By means of careful assessment and calculation, an alternative from the non-assistance method would therefore be for Hong Kong to assist in a way that does not compromise anything that is of moral significance. This will involve an assessment of the breadth and degree of humanitarian assistance, as well as a careful consideration of the depth of the aid.  

For example, while Hong Kong’s land problem renders the city unsuitable for taking in long-term refugees, it may opt to set up complementary pathways for admission69, which is a relocation service intended to help refugees lawfully stay in a third country. It may also provide a well-assessed degree of financial assistance given the city’s advantageous financial position. Other forms of humanitarian assistance can also include legal training of overseas human rights lawyers and the creation of a global  network of legal support. While this is not an exhaustive list of suggestions, it is definitely an area of significance in the future assessments concerning Hong Kong’s refugee framework.  

PART 7 Conclusion 

In light of Hong Kong’s past and current efforts towards its refugee framework, this paper seeks to question: To what extent is Garrett Hardin’s lifeboat ethics model desirable in the context of Hong Kong’s refugee system? In proving the above notion, this paper assesses Hardin’s views on humanitarian aid from Hardin’s views concerning1) one’s moral accountability to provide humanitarian aid, 2) the outcomes of humanitarian aid, and 3) nations’ ability to provide humanitarian aid. It argues that on the first level, Hardin provides an incomplete and preferential view, as it only considers refugees to be the cause, and not a product of the exploitation of common resources. On the second level, Hardin also provides limited insight on his ethical egoistic view, by failing to take into account the possibility where humanitarian assistance doesn’t compromise, but actually furthers one’s benefits. On the third level, Hardin’s renders his notion incomplete as he fails to encapsulate the flexible breadth and depth of humanitarian assistance. This paper subsequently offers an evaluative discussion to the notion which looks beyond Hardin’s concern over scarcity and suggests that the real issue lies in the unequal distribution of resource. It does so through a discussion and application Peter Singer’s argument on humanitarian assistance, as a possible way of addressing Hardin’s incomplete arguments.  

Ultimately, this paper is of the view that Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, which supports the act of not assisting refugees, is only desirable to the extent, where it provides a logical but limited insight on the breadth and depth of humanitarian assistance. Beyond Hardin’s either-or approach, Hong Kong should therefore consider its humanitarian efforts in a more complete spectrum that truly encapsulates the versatility and possibilities humanitarian aid has to offer. 

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To what extent is mercy as depicted in Les Misérables and the Bible compatible to law, in the context of Hong Kong’s criminal justice system?

1. Introduction 

Beyond their literary artistry, the Bible and Les Misérables are known for their portrayal on humanity, and remain two of the most influential literary works to date. With regards to their critical insight in punishment and forgiveness, this essay seeks to answer the question: To what extent is mercy as depicted in Les Misérables and the Bible compatible to law, in the context of Hong Kong’s criminal justice system? 

It does so by first examining Les Misérables and the notion that one may find mercy to be antagonistic to the rule of law. It then analyses how mercy completes the law in the Bible. Subsequently, it contends that the notions can co-exist under different forms of justice: Where justice is concerned with a positivist notion of fairness, law and mercy are not compatible because the discretionary nature of mercy weakens the maintenance of social order. Contrarily, law and mercy converge under a textured, moral-centric understanding of justice that focuses on one’s acceptance of the moral principles behind the law. Lastly, it assesses the claim that both notions are not mutually exclusive in our criminal justice system. It does so by examining Hong Kong’s criminal sentencing policy, which suggests that while mercy is an effective guidance to morality, it is not a panacea, but an alternative that balances the vigilant application of the law.  

2. Law and mercy as incompatible  

Through the lens of Javert in Les Misérables, law and mercy are incompatible as mercy weakens the purpose and enforcement of an efficient criminal justice system.  

Before assessing this argument, it is important to first assess the significance of character Javert. Javert is the embodiment of strict application of the law who acts without mercy and rigidly enforces the law. He would argue that rules and laws must be abided to effectively maintain social order. When prostitute Fantine insulted the Mayer, Javert imposed a six month sentence on her as a punishment. As she begs for his mercy, Javert "turned his back away" from her both figuratively and literally. To Javert, imposing punishment and drawing definite boundaries, deters Fantine from committing the same crime again. The effect of a rigid criminal justice system is also highlighted by Fantine’s claim that she is "not afraid of the Mayor" but is "truly frightened" of Javert, the enforcer of the laws. Strict enforcement and fear effectively deter criminals from committing wrongdoings again. This notion supports Javert's contentions that law allows for punishment, and punishment deters crime. Today, preventing harm to society and deterring people from bringing harm is of utmost significance in our criminal justice system, and one may argue that a strict, merciless society is an effective way in accomplishing so.  

Therefore, Javert would argue that mercy is incompatible to the law, as it malignantly affects its ability to enforce the law strictly by leaving leeway. He describes kindness as an "ill-begotten" means to "disorganize society". To him, mercy opens up the legal system to discretionary justice, which can result in inconsistencies of the law. Javert not only finds this an unfair outcome but "total destruction of himself, the law and the society".  

While his beliefs seem rather extreme at first, they are not without merits. The criminal justice system law highly concerns precedent and consistency and embraces the rule of law. Under the rule of law, no one is above the law, and it is not for "a man like a Javert to set aside… the dictates of the written law". Suppose Javert decides to Fantine go with mercy. In a criminal justice system that values abidance to precedents, the fact that Javert can arbitrarily decide on what to do implies that he is not subject to the law, and therefore above the law. This would thus erode the rule of law, considering under the rule of law, no one is above the law. Therefore, one may claim that the discretionary nature of mercy renders the criminal system an inefficient one as it is inconsistent. 

Further, laws are codified and executed to govern social behaviour. Enforcing Laws with mercy and discretion may, therefore, be seen as laws which weaken the cardinal goals of its criminal justice system. Thus, in support of Javert's strict and uniform view of the law, one would argue that mercy does not correspond to the law, as mercy attracts inconsistencies in and weakens the criminal justice system.    

3. Law and mercy as compatible 

While the previous suggests that law and mercy are incompatible, one may alternatively argue that mercy not only corresponds to but also reinforces the law by completing one's manifestation of moral values, which are embedded in the law. From the story of King David to the parable of the Prodigal Son, the Bible supports that those treated with mercy do not merely practice the law – they learn to accept and embrace the law.  

The story of King David serves as a compelling account of how mercy induces and completes one's understanding of the law. As a man who is moved by lust, Kind David impregnates the wife of his faithful soldier Uriah, Bathsheba, whom he proceeds to murder during a battle. Under today's criminal justice system, David would be a murderer who also committed adultery and punished heavily. He disobeyed the laws and "despised the word of the Lord" and did "what is evil in his sight". Eventually, David received forgives from God despite the temporal punishment of his child's death. Upon receiving forgiveness, he was also granted another son, Solomon, by God. Through the eventual act of mercy, Kind David was able to achieve the revelation of the truth of forgiveness, restored his sense of morality and his behaviour. Therefore, mercy helps Kind David not only realise his wrongdoings, but undergo a transformation that enables him to internalise on the law. 

Apart from the story of Kind David, the parable of the Prodigal son provides insight on how mercy completes the law. Upon finding himself chastened after taking his father's inheritance and squandering in the wild, a young son decides to go home and seek his father's mercy. While the son does not commit any crime explicitly,  the story "borrows heavily from a legal repertoire": The young son is an offender who pleads for mercy from his father, the enforcer of justice who welcomes the son with open arms. This juxtaposes the older son, who represents the "wider law-abiding community" and centres directly on the justice of his father's actions. He angrily complains at the father for "kill[ing] the fattened calf" for younger son who he finds undeserving of mercy. 

The law often distinguishes the right from the wrong, yet in the parable, it was the father's forgiveness that helps the son realise what the right thing is, by reaffirming his self-actualization. Specifically, the son's soliloquy is predicated on the him having "come to himself" (eis heauton de elthōn). This is an idiom often used to denote a thoroughgoing change of heart caused through the "acceptance of moral blame, recognition of the impact of one's behaviour on others", and more importantly, the mercy of others. This helps one go further than the compliance with social expectations, by reinforcing moral standards through self-actualization. Mercy and the law are therefore compatible in a way that mercy prompts one to consider the depths of one's depravity and induces one's internalization of the law. 

 4. Law and mercy as both incompatible and compatible  

This section seeks to dissect and explain the notion that law and mercy can be both incompatible and compatible, under different forms of justice. Specifically, these two forms of justice are called a thin sense of justice and a thick sense of justice.  

4.1. Defining the terms 

A thin sense of justice refers to justice in the context of "goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness". It refers to the form of justice that emphasizes codified rules and "positivistic, rule-governed concepts". It echoes the rigidly enforced justice sought by Javert.  

On the other hand, a thick sense of justice refers to justice to "the full panoply of human moral… and emotional aspirations." It relates to the human experience more than "approaches that confine justice to technical consideration of laws, rights and freedoms". It allows us to hold the law and mercy together in the domain of criminal justice, in a way that it encourages restorative justice in pursuit of compliance with moral standards.  

 4.2. A thin form of justice  

Under the thin notion of justice, law and mercy are not compatible, as the functions of positive laws are antagonistic to the discretionary nature of mercy. In a criminal justice system, laws must achieve retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Some, if not most, of these goals attempt to prevent the perpetrator from committing further wrongdoings by evoking immediate reactions of fear and shame. Shame, in particular, does not focus on one's moral responsibilities, but the discrepancy between one's ideal self and one's actual self.  

At the start of Les Miserables, the law punishes and dehumanizes Jan Valjean. He feels shameful because he is not who he wants to be - a street rat whose life does not matter. This experience deters him from getting caught again. Surely, drawing clear lines of demarcation can effectively maintain social order. If Jean Valjean were forgiven right from the start, he would not be deterred from recommitting his crime. In that case, one would follow that mercy undermines the rule of law, as it departs from a positivistic system.  

 4.3. A thick form of justice 

However, as justice requires deliberation and vigilance, is also benefits from mercy and forgiveness. Therefore, one may argue that a thicker notion of justice holds justice and mercy together in a restorative sense, by facilitating one's recognition of morality and internalization of moral principles. Unlike the thin notion of justice, this version of justice seeks to induce one's feeling of guilt as opposed to shame. Guilt is a "negative moral self-evaluation" involving one's behaviour. This one senses a discrepancy between one's moral self and actual self, and this sense of discrepancy is often induced by mercy.  

As previously discussed, punishment deters Jean Valjean from committing the crime again. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, he still believes he did what he did for the right reasons. It was not until the bishop's forgiveness does he undergo a true behavioural transformation. Soon after the bishop's mercy, Jean Valjean was overwhelmed with "the weight of his bad conscience", and called himself "miserable", a word that connotes wretched behaviour. Through this feeling of guilt-induced by mercy, he can internalize and truly understand what he could not comprehend through mere positive laws and punishment - morals.  

To Jean Valjean, mercy induces the actualization of his transgressions and produces guilt. Through guilt, Jean Valjean was able to achieve a thicker and restorative form of justice. Therefore, one would argue that a thicker notion of justice holds justice and mercy together as the domain of criminal justice in a restorative sense; it goes one step beyond one's recognition of morality. 

However, this is not to say that our society should function under the thick form of justice alone, or that one of the two notions of justice should reign supreme. In fact, one may further suggest that both forms of justices serve different purposes in our criminal justice system. Under such view, the criminal justice system should function under the thinner version of justice, due to practical concerns of maintaining social order and the rule of law. The thicker, more textured view of justice should then serve as a guide to balancing the "incessant orgy of retribution" when executing the thin version of justice.  

5. Applying forms of justice to Hong Kong’s criminal justice system  

As discussed above, law and mercy are both compatible and incompatible depending on the goals and forms of justice. This section seeks to expand the idea that both forms of justice can co-exist in our current criminal justice system by serving different roles. It does so by examining this theoretical notion under Hong Kong's sentencing practices.  

With regards to recent updates through HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam and HKSAR v Abdou Maikido Abdoulkarim, persons charged may be granted a discounted sentence if they plead guilty during or before the proceedings, subject to the court's overriding discretion. For instance, if one pleads guilty on the first day of trial, the court may grant a 20 per cent discount from the starting point for sentence. Afterwards, the discount will be less than 20 per cent and so on.  

While this principle mainly functions to guarantee judicial efficiency, it is also an attempt to strike a balance between mercy and the law, by giving one a chance to seek mercy and "come to himself", as the younger son did in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Also, this does not entirely excuse the behaviour of the person charged and imposes the necessary means and punishment to maintain social order. One may, therefore, argue that the sentencing principle reflects the theorized dynamic between the forms of justice discussed above because it introduces morality while operating under a thinner sense of justice. The possibility of limited, but merciful outcome echoes the idea that "forgiveness, like mercy, must be infused into, be part and parcel of the very concept of justice."  

However, while some may plead guilty due to a genuine feeling of guilt, some may do so to take advantage of the system and plead guilty as a tactical move to escape from a heavier sentence. Therefore, there is a delicate balance between exercising judicial discretion and maintaining social order by preventing abuses of this discretion. Therefore, the balancing exercise of law and mercy is a continuing practice.  

6. Conclusion 

This essay questions the extent to which mercy is compatible with law in the context of Hong Kong's criminal justice system. While Les Misérables highlights how mercy may weaken the rule of law by disturbing social order, the Bible also shows how mercy may induce one's internalization of morality and acceptance of the law. Through literary interpretation and legal application, this essay is of the view that mercy is compatible to the law insofar as it serves to induce one's acceptance and internalization to the law. Law and mercy can be both incompatible and compatible under different domains of the criminal justice system by serving various roles. This involves a delicate balance between exercising judicial discretion and maintaining social order by preventing abuses of the criminal justice system. Ultimately, it suggests that our criminal justice system should give ample consideration to black-letter laws and codified legal principles, and refer to a thicker form of justice as an essential guide and but a manual. 

Transformation of the Self and Law as Depicted in Les Misérables

 1. Introduction 

Though first written in 1862, Les Misérables serves as a socially-relevant commentary on our society today. The main storyline revolves around the conflict of Jean Valjean, an ex-criminal, and Javert, an inspector, and their struggles within themselves and with each other. Throughout the film, both characters have showcased character development in tremendous depth, and this essay seeks to evaluate the transition undergone by them. This leads to the essay topic: Transformation of the self and law as depicted in Les Misérables. 

It argues that while the law tries to transform individuals and help distinguish the good from the bad, it only does so to a minimal extent through punishment and social segregation. Ultimately, shaming and condemnation fails to transform an individual’s cognitive understanding of modality. On the other hand, the transformative power of mercy changes a person’s actions and leads to the transfiguration of a person, as shown in the transition of Jean Valjean. Nevertheless, while the two seem to diverge, the essay asserts that the death of Javert only represents the death of a corrupted form of the law, which serves to exist in our world, but is not the only form of law. Ultimately, there exists an ideal form of the law, which is metaphysically unreachable but serves as a guide for us to follow and approach. It is unattainable because in today’s society, the law must operate in a way that regulates human activity and impose negative consequences upon those who have wronged, which by definition refutes the notion of mercy and forgiveness.  

2. Transformation of the self 

2.1. Transformation of the self through law 

In the film, Jean Valjean was condemned, shamed and stigmatized by the society for stealing a loaf of bread. The innkeepers and children rejected him because of his status as a criminal. Through punishment, he has learned how to behave in a way that does not get him punished again; however, he still finds himself justified in stealing the bread. 

On hindsight, this seems absurd, because one of the main functions of the law is to deter and condemn socially unacceptable behaviour, and reward those who behave well. In a way, one of the positive obligations of the law is to rehabilitate and transform,1 yet this does not seem to be the case for Jean Valjean. While there has been a transformation in terms of his identity and status, there was only a minimal degree of substantial and positive transformation in character. Instead of becoming a good person, Jean Valjean simply became a resentful person who finds his actions unlawful but justified. This is because while the law itself aims to provide momentary punishment to criminals, its repercussions prevent positive transformation of an individual in the long term; even though his punishment is momentary, the society has sentenced him for life.  

As shown through Javert, there is little room for change in face of a retributive legal system. The law is “simple and monotonous, like Euclidean logic — it’s a system closed to alternatives, shut-up against intervention.”2 The rigidity of this law prevents transformation. The law not only punishes Jean Valjean through physical labour and confinement, it does so labelling him. While this in itself does not seem like much, it leads to social stigmatization and a lifelong sentence of shame, resulting in rejection by the society. So, even in the case where Jean Valjean was able to become a better person and transform while he was in custody, his life onwards has already been predetermined by the crimes he has committed. In the movie, we see that Jean Valjean tried to be hospitable and begged for a shelter, yet the children’s mockery and rejection by innkeepers render his momentary attempt to transform impossible; the only way for him to be left alone was to scare the children, and be the monstrous criminal the society has labelled him as. Not only is he imprisoned for stealing, in a way, Jean Valjean is also sentenced for life, leaving him no room for him to transform.  

The rigidity of the law is also highlighted in the in the film, when Javert let Jean Valjean go. Javert does so not because he was merciful, but because he wanted things to be equal between them – he did not want to owe Jean Valjean for letting him go during the revolution. In a system where a person should only get what he deserves, it is almost impossible to leave any room for change. Thus, transformation of the self through law is quite minimal.  

In light of the issue at hand, the question is: If the law fails to transform a person, what, then, causes the transformation of the self?  

2.2. Transformation of the self through the Christian notion of mercy 

One would argue that instead of the legal system, true transformational power is derived from the Christian notion of mercy as depicted in the film. 

In the film, the bishop not only refuses to accuse Jean Valjean for stealing the silverware, he also gives Jean Valjean the things he had stolen. In law, Jean Valjean deserves punishment and condemnation; instead, the bishop showed him love. Still, the process of Jean Valjean’s transformation was not without struggle. Right after mercy has been bestowed upon him, Jean Valjean’s immediate reaction was to leave; yet in the midst of his dilemma, he finally decided to embrace mercy and forgiveness. The bishop was “motivated by a desire to rehabilitate Valjean in the eyes of God,”3 which provided Jean Valjean with a transformative experience, and “afforded him the means by which to recover his virtue through a life devoted to goodness.”4 One might even call this a transfigurative experience, where Jean Valjean undergoes a spiritual change that brings him closer to God. 

Here, the transition is shown through how Jean Valjean went from being one who has sinned, to one who was able to reconcile with love and be renewed. In the end, he was able to reconcile with himself by saving Javert, who “has spent a lifetime denying [Valjean] mercy.”5 Unlike the law, mercy and forgiveness allow Jean Valjean to internalize his guilt and to be reborn as a different person, and allows him to be set free from the burden of his past. Jean Valjean’s experience has not only changed his status from guilty to innocent, but it changed him into a person whose character reflects the one he received his grace from. This ultimately shows the life-changing impact grace can have when extended to another, and the process of salvation through mercy. 

Given the transformation of the self through the law and mercy, it seems like the two diverge in a way that they lead to different degrees and levels of the transformation. On one hand, forgiveness and mercy transform a person, whereas the law in its form does not reform a person’s mind, but merely one’s actions.  In the eyes of Javert, it is unjust to love others the way Jean Valjean does, because love is unconditional, and disregards what a person deserves. Mercy involves the altruistic practice of the satisfaction of the self and others, while Javert’s world of justice resolves around fairness and vengeance. So, while the law seeks vengeance and justice, “grace sees to redemption, and the tightrope walker betwixt is love.”6 

3. Transformation of the law 

3.1. The death of law 

This dichotomy of the love and mercy is shown through how Jean Valjean’s mercy to Javert shattered his faith in the law, which holds that people should get what they deserve. In the end, unlike Jean Valjean who accepts mercy and embraces it, Javert would rather die with his ideals and then undergo this transformation of giving into the mercy and love shown by Jean Valjean. In other words, he would rather give up his life and resort to his world without mercy, than to live and accept that he has been embraced by Jean Valjean’s forgiveness and mercy. As he sang, “there is no way to go on/there is no way I can turn”7 Like his law, Javert leaves no room to himself for change. Given that his character is the personification of the law, the death of him also signifies the death of the law in the face of mercy and love. Therefore, it seems as though the film is drawing our attention to the divergence of the two, and how they cannot co-exist. Is this dichotomy, then, indicative of the incompatibility between the law and mercy?  

To some, this might seem to suggest that love trumps law. While one punishes to transform yet fails to do so, the other transforms through forgiveness. However, one might also argue that the death of Javert and the law is not the death of all law, and Javert simply represents the corrupted law in our society today. His idea of the law is corrupted, because it “entangles the poor and privileges the wealthy”8, and it fails to recognise the life-long unfairly “consigns the poor to a life that is nasty, brutish, and mercifully short.”9 repercussions of punishment.  

3.2. The ultimate law 

In an ideal world, there is a middle ground for law and love to co-exist. Therefore, it seems as though the death of Javert and his ideals is not the end of the law, but a start of something different. In fact, the question perhaps is not whether there should be law or mercy, but whether there is a middle ground for love and mercy. One might claim that there exists a divine and ultimate law that signifies the unity of the two. So, perhaps what follows Javert’s death is not the absence of law, but the reborn of another personification of the law – a more ideal, almost utopian-like version of it. In other words, the corrupted law Javert represents is incompatible to mercy and love not because of the law itself, but because it fails to capture and the ultimate law, which is compatible to love and mercy. 

Then, the questions would be whether we can envision an alternative ending where Javert, as instrument of the law, is transformed and lives. Perhaps, in an alternative setting, while Jean Valjean’s notion of mercy would be highlighted, the law would still be deemed necessary and compatible to mercy and forgiveness.  

Nevertheless, there seems to be a reason why Victor Hugo, of all the replicas of the law, chose to showcase this corrupted and overly-rigid version of the law. The same argument would entail that this is because the story seeks to show “how pervasive the human penchant to establish false laws is.”10 

Realistically, the ideal form of law is a metaphysical order that humans are unable to replicate, because of the subsidiary function of the law. The subsidiary function of the law refers to the purpose of regulating and controlling human activity and actions. The ideal form can never be achieved by humans because there are always people like Monsieur Thénardier and Madame Thénardier who needs to be deterred through punishment.  Without imposing consequences and punishment, humans would depart from the social code of conduct and maximise utility for their personal gains, and this is an unacceptable way to operate as a society. Therefore, in the case where the ideal law is formulated as a command to love and forgiveness, our current law, given the necessity of social regulation, would fail by definition. Thus, with our limitations, realistically, the closest thing that is desirable for our current society would then be the suicide of Javert. 

4. Conclusion and implications 

The law as shown in the film aims to transform but fails to do so. On the other hand, mercy and forgiveness transform a person in a way that changes a person’s purpose and outlook in life. We must, however, recognise that the law shown in the film is not representative of the ideal version of law, and is a corrupted version of law we must employ in our society. 

It is corrupted because ideally, the law itself should not depart from love and grace. However, the subsidiary function of the law to impose consequences and regulate human action, inevitably diverges from the notion of mercy and redemption. Even in the end of the movie, the victorious scene of people singing was not one of our society, but an imaginary utopia. 

Nevertheless, the ideal law should serve as a guide that brings us closer to the optimal – the best humans can do given the current circumstances. For instance, the restorative justice model today would be an attempt to balance consequences and forgiveness through reconciliation. Our current law is forever changing, and is hopefully taking us closer to its ultimate form. However, this still means one would always look upon our current law as a failure to comply with the ideal model of love and mercy, but it would also be one that we deem necessary. Perhaps, this is why our society is les miserable – one that is wretched. 

On Nietzsche and Truth

This essay serves to discuss Nietzsche’s disposition on the construction of concepts and the attainment of knowledge. Nietzsche posits that human beings are unable to comprehend the truth; instead, we invent and construct knowledge that departs from the truth. On the other hand, one might argue that that claim itself is self-refuting; however, that argument would be flawed because it is based on the wrongful assumption that the world is rational.  

Truth is the unity of (1) The thinking of an object, and (2) The subject itself. In other words, to obtain the truth, our understanding of the world must align with what the world really is. Therefore, to see if truth is acquirable by us, we must find out what (1) and (2) are, and if they can, or do, converge. The thinking of an object is what Nietzsche calls a “concept”; it is devised through a compilation of human experiences, and our perceptive faculties. The subject itself, on the other hand, exists independently from our interpretations; it refers to the individuality of the subject. Truth can only be acquired when (1) and (2) converge. In this case, not only do the two diverge, our perceptions bring us further from the reality of the world. Due to the discrepancy between humans’ understanding of the world and the actuality of it given our perceptive shortcomings, Nietzsche argues that truth is unattainable by humans.  

If humans are incapable of acquiring the truth, what, then, do we make of what we consider to be knowledge? Nietzsche argues that what we consider to be knowledge is a set of ideas we construct. Due to our perceptive shortcomings, our perception transforms our attempt to capture individuality, into the exercise of equalising the unequal. Namely, we equalise the unequal by extracting from “countless individualized and consequently unequal actions” and finding a common denominator. As a result, the “individual differences and distinguishing aspects” of the subject itself are covered up. So, when we invent knowledge of what we observe, we do not invent the truth, but merely concepts that reflect how we understand the truth.  

Nevertheless, Nietzsche recognises the inevitability of conceiving knowledge, given that it is impossible for humans to be anything today without some kind of human invention. What he found to be concerning, is not that we are inventing knowledge, but our failure to distinguish concepts from the truth. We do so by “overlooking what is individual and actual”, and acting as if we have obtained the truth. Ultimately, not only are we identifying the unidentifiable, we are treating the unidentifiable as if they are the identifiable. 

To elaborate his notion that what we consider truth today is a façade and truth is unattainable by men, Nietzsche uses two examples. Today, when we evaluate a person’s honesty, we claim that a person is not lying because they are honest. However, honesty itself is a concept constructed by men, and we are simply evaluating something with our own standards. This is an example of our invention of knowledge. Another is Nietzsche’s example of the leaf, which also explains the process of inventing knowledge. When looking at a leaf, we are faced with a couple of perceptive limitations. Our senses restricts us from fully experiencing and appreciating the leaf. Also, there are only so many leaves we will observe; we are physically barred from observing every single leaf in the world. In reality, each leaf is an individual, and is different from each other. Therefore, we are inevitably left with a generalised definition of a leaf. This in effect strips away any distinguishing attributes of every leaf.  

Nietzsche’s claim seems to be reasonably valid on hindsight. When we tell a child what an apple is, we would show her a picture of an apple. When she sees an apple, she would associate what she sees to images she has been exposed to. She would not doubt if this is what an actual apple looks like, because it satisfies all the generalised attributes of an apple. Thus, it seems irrefutable that there isn’t a point of knowledge that doesn’t require the invention of knowledge, and that truth is unattainable.  

However, upon further inspection, this argument seems paradoxical. Suppose the previous claim asserts the following: 

1. Everything we think we know is a human invention and truth is unattainable by men 

1. Statement (a) is true. 

If statement (a) is correct, then nothing we say can be true, because we are incapable of attaining and asserting the truth. This would mean that the statement itself, if it is true, would be just as unattainable as other sets of truth. If nothing we know is true, then statement (b) would not stand, because it implies that humans are capable of asserting the truth. Therefore, in the case where one were to say that both statements are true, he would be making an irrational claim, because the statements are self-refuting and contradictory. In the case where at least one of the statement is untrue, the initial argument would not exist at all.  

This is undesirable as it is illogical and irrational. Today, a scientist would expect no contradictions from a valid hypothesis; at the same time, most people would find a theory that is inconsistent with human reasoning to be imperfect and incorrect.  

Nevertheless, one might maintain that the previous argument is based on the wrongful presumption that the way we understand our world is rational. The original argument states that there is a lack of certainty in the way humans understand the world, and that everything we think we know is a metaphor invented by ourselves. Therefore, the world is irrational in a sense that everything is a human artefact, and can be anything as long as it satisfies the collective attitude. Take our legal system as an example. When a judge convicts a murderer, she imposes a sentence. This serves as a punishment because the murderer did something bad. The idea of murder, the degree of sentencing, and the base idea that murder is bad are all derived from our society’s collective attitude of morality. In a way, this is irrational, because our knowledge of the world around us is contingent; it is subject to change. During prehistoric cultural stages, killing someone for one’s own preservation would likely be less morally reprehensive than it would be in our comparatively modernised society. As we can see, even the moral code to which humans seem to hold so definitely today could be otherwise than it is. When persons in authority impose criminal liability towards those who kill others, they are inventing a set of laws that are open to further changes in the future. This human invention and the contingence of it illustrates the irrationality of our understanding of the world, and how it can change overtime. Therefore, in this case, it would be incorrect to presume that our world is rational.  

In an irrational society where truth is unattainable, human reasoning would be one of the many unreliable human inventions, because we have uncertainty in corresponding to the way the world really is. Therefore, contradiction through human reasoning would not matter in this case, and would not pose as a valid critique against Nietzsche’s notion, given the mistaken assumption that human reasoning and rationality dictates reality. Ultimately, the argument that a notion is wrong because it is irrational would only be valid in a realm where reasoning and rationality are valid means of assessing the truth.  

In fact, it seems like Nietzsche has addressed and recognised the “dogmatic assertion”1 about the paradoxical dilemma. He asserts that we construct universals by ignoring the differences and focusing on the common features. At the same time, he also questions the difference between the universal and individual, by claiming that even the distinction between our knowledge and the truth is “anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things.”2 However, despite his almost-dubious attitude towards his own ideas, he continues to claim what truth is, and how it departs from our invented knowledge. So, while he seems to recognise the vulnerability of this distinction between individual and universal, it remains that Nietzsche holds the unattainability of truth as his dominant response to the dynamic between us and the truth.  

This seems like a devastating idea that greatly challenges everything humans have believed in, because it suggests that nothing we know holds value, and we know nothing. However, while we accept that our understanding of the world is as black as a canvas, it also means that we are free to paint it however we like. Since what we know is invented by us, we are free to construct anything. Once we recognise that what we understand as truth are really lies, what seems to be fragility would become the beauty of life.  

Gregg Easterbrook and Yuval Noah Harari on Happiness

Happiness “consists in seeing one’s life in its entirety as meaningful and worthwhile.” On hindsight, humans seem to be doing better. Not only has modern medicine decreased child mortality, there is also “near elimination of large-scale famines.” These positive outcomes in alleviating miseries means that “we must be happier than out medieval ancestors.” However, are we truly happier? Easterbrook and Harari, inform us that the world is not being happier. So, why isn’t the world becoming happier?  

Harari stipulates that despite today’s prosperity, people have more meaninglessness due to social alienation and distorted expectations. He explored manipulative biochemistry as a source of positive physical response, and Buddhism as a way of detachment from happiness. Ultimately, he proposes that perhaps happiness is the wrong question to ask. Before, people were more content; they found happiness in their community, and bonded with nature. In the past, there was also less comparison and expectation, and individuals found meaning to their lives through fulfilling their personal aspirations, instead of unattainable standards. To Harari, men found meaning in life “in collective delusions about the afterlife”, to which we are, according to Baumeister, “no longer idealistic and gullible enough to believe in.” In a way, waking up from the delusion of the afterlife contributes to unhappiness, as people now have more meaninglessness despite being materially better-off.  One of the core components to a lack of fulfilment today is the change in expectations.  Happiness “depends on the correlation between objective conditions and subjective expectations.” While expectations are skyrocketing, our material condition is not catching up, which renders us unsatisfied. Our increase in prosperity contributes to our unhappiness, because while we have more, we also want and expect more.  

Harari also proposes that since happiness is only a physiological response, perhaps happiness doesn’t matter. Under the idea of manipulative biochemistry, happiness “is determined by a complex system of nerves, neurons, synapses, and various biochemical substances.” This leads Harari to explore the use of psychiatric drugs, such as “soma” from Huxley’s Brave New World, which provides pure happiness without meaning. To Harari, humans are only a part of the “blind evolutionary processes that operates without goal or purpose.” If this is the case, our life has no meaning, and thus the only way to attain fulfilment is not to become attached to the feeling of happiness. In a Buddhist sense, Harari depicts that it might be best to not actively pursue happiness, since “the more significance we give to our feelings, the more we crave, them, and the more we suffer.” While seemingly counter-intuitive on hindsight, our pursuit of happiness is what keeps us away from a life with meaning and fulfilment.  

Easterbrook depіcts a smaller portіon of tіme on post-war Amerіcan hіstory. Nowadays, “whіle we seem to have more, we’re not gettіng any happіer.” Before, depressіon was a form of self-іndulgence people had no tіme or energy to experіence; nowadays, people can afford to feel badly. Wіth happіness no longer beіng a default, men feel the need to accomplіsh somethіng to deserve happіness. Thіs constant pursuіt of stіmulatіon and achіevement can be demandіng and unfulfіllіng. Moreover, the “blurrіng of needs and wants.” leaves us unfulfіlled. Nowadays, many have mіstaken theіr desіres as mandatory requіrements to happіness. Sіnce wants can never be fulfіlled, our constant desіre for somethіng more ensures that “even the rіch wіll never be materіally satіsfіed.” Also, comparіson and competіtіon also contrіbute to an unhappy socіety. Under “reference anxіety”, the core of our dіssatіsfactіon іs the expectatіon for more. Happіness іs comparatіve, and our socіety іs constantly showerіng us wіth unrealіstіc expectatіons, whіch contrіbutes to lower self-esteem. Іn “Keepіng-up-wіth-the-Jones”33, we are saіd to attaіn satіsfactіon or a lack thereof, by comparіng our experіences to others’. Moreover, “antіcіpatіon-іnduced anxіety” prevents us from apprecіatіng that the present іs good. Thіs renders many unhappіer, because fulfіlment іs caused by a sense of progress. Another reason that contrіbutes to unhappіness nowadays іs a lack of genuіne socіal connectіons. Whіle the socіal medіa makes socіalіsіng easіer, іt also renders relatіonshіps less authentіc. Thіs can be explaіn wіth the “nіce hotel room factor”, whіch suggests that whіle we are gettіng better materіalіstіc achіevements, we are nevertheless more depressed because of socіal іsolatіon from one another and іndіvіdualіsm.  

Gіven Hararі and Easterbrook’s approaches, the world іs becomіng unhappіer. However, does thіs mean we should then become Buddhіsts, as Hararі suggests, and detach ourselves from happіness? Whіle maybe іt іs possіble for some, іt іs unrealіstіc to expect everyone to do so. Perhaps, beіng happy now іs enough. Іt may be that lіfe wіll be good enough іn our world, so we can be largely happy as іt іs. How, then do we deal wіth the problems Easterbrook and Hararі mentіoned? As Easterbrook poіnts out, happіness іs caused by both our own desіres, and the socіety construct. Іn the future, іt mіght be possible to lessen or alleviate this problem by better social arrangements, and a reconstruction of our values and what we find important. In the end, maybe the key to happiness is not quantity, but quality.

The History of Western Thought As it Relates to the Meaning of Life

The history of Western thought has gone through drastic changes over the years, in relation to the meanings of life. This article assesses ideologies from various thinkers, and evaluation possible shifts in the future. 

John Calvin contended that men is “nothing but a subsistence in God alone.” Given that our meaning in life comes from the understanding of reality and the truth, this Calvinistic view suggests that one can only achieve fulfilment through God, by stipulating that “Lord alone are to be found true wisdom, solid strength, perfect goodness and unspotted righteousness.” It also suggests that our meaning of life comes from an ultimately reality, which exists beyond our tangible world. This heavy emphasis on religion and assertation on God’s sovereignty highlights the period of Reformation, which illustrated the community’s progressive return to God, and the idea of seeking meaning through a divine being.  

Au contraire, during the Scientific Revolution, Galileo highlighted the question of whether reasoning should be restricted by faith. He believed that in one’s pursuit of knowledge, one can acquire the absolute truth through the “inexorable and immutable” nature. He also supported the significance of scientific reasoning and sense expressions, which diverges from “supernatural things which are matters of faith.” Nevertheless, one would argue that religion established a basis for scientific curiosity and thus revolution. The Scientific Revolution provided a variety to one’s source of life fulfilment – empirical truth through modern science.   

Apart from the Galileo, Condorcet had shed a slightly different light on the Scientific Revolution. Condorcet claimed that our pursuit of the meaning of life depends on our relationship and “enlightenment of the natural world”. The rationale behind this idea is the definitive nature of men, and that we will all eventually die. However, he also contended that “the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite”, and that men can progress with no limit. In other words, the enlightenment of the nature will spur our understanding of the social world through the course of our existence, and can help us better understand reality, and ultimately our meaning of life. Condorcet here highlights the reliance of nature and reason during the Scientific Revolution.  

On the other hand, Huxley represents the destruction of faith in reason by claiming that morality and duty are often at war with our natural instincts. He believed that instead of treating nature as a friend, we should see nature as an enemy. Huxley supported his belief by saying that the ethics of evolution is nothing but a fallacy, and that men should not observe other animals’ natural selection process. He argued that just because animals and plants have advanced through the survival of the fittest, doesn’t mean men must learn from “the same process to help them towards perfection,” because what constitutes as fittest depends on various factors and further conditions. Besides, perfection is not reliant on the natural world’s survival of the fittest, but from assessing “who are ethically the best”, which is challenged by our cosmic. Therefore, one might assert that according to Huxley, nature is in fact opposed to human mortality. 

Additionally, Freud’s notion that we cannot trust ourselves is reflective of the erosion of faith. Freud claimed that men is under a three-layer “Narcissistic illusion” which not only makes nature, but everything, our enemy. The first layer, the “cosmological blow” to human narcissism, illustrated how men ““naively followed the dictates of his sense-perceptions” which are unreliable. This is shown through Copernicus’ theory of the earth and universe, and how one can never know what is true. The second layer of the Narcissistic illusion is the “biological blow”, which rejects the understanding that men “acquired a dominating position over” other creatures in the animal kingdom. In reality, men are no different from animals. The third layer, the “psychological blow to human narcissism”, contends that one’s instincts, contrary to one’s belief, “cannot be totally restrained” and are unconscious. Our senses are “incomplete and untrustworthy perceptions”, yet we continue to be deceived by feeling in control of our demands and desires.  

So, how will this pattern shift in the future? As shown throughout this essay, most fragments of theories of life have illustrated reliance on a particular ideology or belief. Previous notions of pursuing truth and find purpose to living have been rejected, be it the divine existence of God, or scientific findings in nature. Perhaps, in the future, the question is not if there will be a God, but what will be the new God. With reference to Kaku’s reading, the future ideology in relation to meanings of life might be defined by technology. While we don’t religiously worship our phones and computers, technology has shown its God-like powers in a curious way, and it has taken control of our lives nowadays. To look beyond men’s progressive reliance towards technology, perhaps we can speculate that above technology, what we yearn for in a meaningful life, is information and knowledge. It is thus reasonable to expect that in the future, sources of information will take the place of God, since after all, history has proven to us that so far men have not found the right answer.

“The Unexamined life is Not Worth Living.”

While Socrates proposes that one should know and understand thyself, some disagree. Nagel contends that there is no point to life, but also suggests that one does not need a life of transcendence to be happy. On the other hand, Solomon claims that humans live by a fiction and a fear of death, while Baumeister suggests that humans like being lied to by the society. Similarly,  Becker proposes that human character is a lie. It seems that to them, it is better for humans to live an unexamined life, since nothing matters.  

Nagel centres his article around the idea that, even though “there seems to be no point of life at all”, does it matter that what we do doesn’t matter? Life can have a meaning larger than oneself, such as making the world a better place for future generations. To him, “It’s not clear why the fact that we’ll be dead in two hundred years should imply that nothing we do now really matters.” Even if the future does not matter, life is about accepting the meaningless of life and enjoy temporary fulfillment. It is no wrong for life to be purposeless, those who disagree suffer from the “Incurable tendency to take ourselves seriously.” In fact, what makes life worth living is not whether or not life as a whole is meaningless, but recognizing the meaninglessness of life and making the most of it. We should thus keep sight on what is in front of us, and “the lives you connected.” 

To Becker, it is perhaps better not to fully understand the examined life. Essentially, our lives are controlled by our desire for self-esteem, and are hence “animated by the artificial symbolism of self-worth.” In his concept of the “inner-newsreel”, Becker further emphasises how our self-worth and meaning of life is acquired from the perception of others, and how our entire life becomes “harangue to others to establish ourselves as peacocks.” By acting entirely of the mercy of other people, the only thing that matters to us is others’ perception, which has zero value realistically. Given that “the self is largely a confusion of insides, outsides, boundaries, alien objects, and it’s de-centered,” we might be better off without understanding the examined life. Alternatively, with reference to Harari, presumably Buddhist meditation will help us become not so attached to other people. By being “liberated from suffering from the impermanent nature of all their feeling”, humans can better examine the inner newsreel as something that is flying by, and not grab on to the obsession over others’ perception.  

Similarly, Baumeister believes that our world is fictitious under the “Mutual bluff”, where men are fooled by society and themselves. Societally, our culture is constantly feeding us with goals and aspirations based on what would best optimize societal operations. We accept these meanings to be true because ‘human beings are addicted to meaning.” Eventually, we are left with self-deception and illusion in our meaning of life. Personally, individuals are constantly deceiving themselves with multiple bluffs. Firstly, we strive for fulfillment unrealistically, by wanting to believe that perfection is attainable. As we are encouraged to attain a reward that doesn’t exist, our pursuit of fulfillment becomes nothing but a wild goose chase. If fulfillment doesn’t exist, then “it is no longer quite viable to think of life as a journey toward a particular destination.” Also, since everything ends with our death, the examined life is not worth living. While this implies that what we do is irrelevant to the individual self who eventually perished, Baumeister suggests that one can still live for cultural influence, historical achievement, and temporary enjoyment. In the example of Lou Gehrig, happiness came from the “extraordinary quality of life experiences and intense fulfillment.” However, while transient fulfillment is sufficient, it is difficult to achieve in our society, where one tends to focus more on how to live a better, than actually living and enjoying a better life.  

In concurrence, Solomon also believes that humans live by fiction and “symbolic mortality.” Many find meaning to their lives because their actions and achievements would continue after death, and that they are a part of a bigger cause that will be remembered. Solomon finds this a lie that most humans are not aware of. In reality, most meanings to life is merely “a defensive distortion and obfuscation of reality to blot out the inevitably of death.” Since humans are all afraid of death, we try to justify our actions by saying that we are contributing to a greater cause. In reality, nothing we do matters upon our death. Thus, the examined life is not worth living, because once we understand there is no meaning, nothing matters anymore.  

So, is it better to live life unexamined? One would say that it is perhaps better not to live an examined life, since it is meaningless. However, perhaps understanding reality isn’t so bad, as we can at least try to make better lives for ourselves. The examined life is worth living to the extent that, it is a risky idea where men can live with the possibility of eventually understanding reality. The examined life can be worth living, but only if we try hard enough.